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Reconstituting Land-Use Federalism to Address
Transitory and Perpetual Disasters: The Bimodal
Federalism Framework


Blake Hudson
ABSTRACT

Scholars analyzing the intersection of federalism and disaster law
and policy have primarily focused on the difficulties federalism poses for
interjurisdictional coordination of disaster response. Though scholars
have highlighted that rising disaster risks and costs are associated with
“land-use planning that exacerbates, rather than mitigates, disaster
risk,” a more holistic analysis of land-use-related disaster law and policy
is needed. This Article provides a more comprehensive framework within
which to analyze prospective mitigation or prevention of disaster risk
and costs through a rebalancing—or reconstituting—of the respective
roles of the federal and state governments in land-use planning. The
federal government does not currently maintain direct regulatory
inputs into a variety of land-use planning policies that exacerbate
disaster risks and costs—a situation that likely results from the history of
jurisprudence declaring that land-use regulation is the “quintessential
state and local government” power under the Constitution. Even so,
because of the national interests at stake and the greater capacity of the
federal government to coordinate standards for disasters with very large
interjurisdictional impacts, greater federal regulatory inputs for
certain disasters are needed where state and local governments have
failed to formulate standards. For other land-use-related disasters,
federal inputs may be less necessary, though overlapping federal, state,
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and local government regulations can yield even more robust disaster
mitigation and prevention policies.
This Article first categorizes the various disasters that implicate
state and local government land-use planning along a “transitoryperpetual” spectrum. This spectrum provides a frame of reference for
assessing which land-use-related disasters are more localized with
shorter temporal effects, and which therefore may require fewer federal
inputs, and those that have far longer temporal effects and larger
interjurisdictional impacts of nationwide import, therefore requiring
greater federal input. The spectrum further provides a framework for
determining the viability, from a constitutional perspective, of federal
regulatory inputs into land-use planning for which more federal inputs
may be needed. This constitutional analysis is undertaken in the context
of a theory of “Bimodal Federalism,” which integrates two modes of
operation of modern U.S. federalism, acknowledging the trend toward
the new “Dynamic Federalism” theory that normatively disregards
separate constitutional spheres of authority for the state and local
governments, while also incorporating the reality that remnants of
“Dual Federalism” theory still inform constitutional jurisprudence
related to certain subject matters—like land-use planning.
Finally, based upon the transitory-perpetual spectrum
categorizations and informed by bimodal federalism analysis, this
Article assesses the appropriate legislative mechanisms for reconstituting
land-use disaster federalism. This Article hypothesizes that those
disasters closer to the perpetual end of the spectrum also happen to be the
ones for which top-down federal inputs into land-use policy are both
more desirable and less constitutionally suspect. Correspondingly, for
land-use-related disasters that are more transitory in nature, top-down
federal inputs may be more constitutionally suspect, thus calling for a
need to explore bilateral and horizontal mechanisms of reconstituting
federalism for all categories of disaster.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Disasters present important governance challenges because they
rarely respect political and regulatory boundaries.1
The headline read, “Minnesota Farmer Battles Gulf ‘Dead
Zone’”2—an intriguing caption to say the least. How could a farmer

1. DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 75 (2d ed. 2010).
2. John D. Sutter, Minnesota Farmer Battles Gulf ‘Dead Zone,’ CNN (Aug. 30, 2010),
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from Minnesota directly and positively impact a resource over one
thousand miles away? The article was about the 2010 dead zone in
the Gulf of Mexico, one of the largest recorded dead zones in
history, scientists say—about the size of the state of New Jersey.3
The dead zone is caused largely by sedimentation and fertilizer
containing nitrogen and phosphorus flowing to the ocean from
farms all along the Mississippi river. These chemicals rob the water of
oxygen, preventing sea life from respiring. Remarkably, 40% of the
land in the United States drains into the Gulf of Mexico via the
Mississippi River Valley.4 The dead zone effectively pits farmers
against fishermen because fertilizer runoff from farming operations
ultimately has an aggregated, substantial effect on commercial
fisheries in the Gulf. One of the most dramatic examples of fishery
impacts are “suicidal shrimp” that actually leap onto the beach in
search of oxygen only to die.5 Commercial interests, however, are
not all that are at stake in the Gulf. Scientists are worried that if
yearly dead zones continue to grow, the Gulf’s entire ecosystem will
reach a “tipping point” from which it may not recover.6
The Minnesota farmer in the story said he considered people
who live and work near the Gulf of Mexico his “neighbors.”7 The
story highlighted the farmer’s recognition that “the land, water and
air are inextricably tied and that the actions of one farmer can be felt
thousands of miles away.”8 The farmer’s perspective is unique, of
course, as it is exceedingly difficult for most farmers in the
Mississippi River Valley to acknowledge, much less establish a plan to
rectify, the negative impacts that their activities have on a resource as
distant as the Gulf.9 Noting that he would “much rather eat wild
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-08-30/tech/gulf.dead.zone.minnesota.farm_1_dead-zonegulf-shrimp?_s=PM:TECH.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Douglas R. Williams, When Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail: Structuring a
Regulatory Response to Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water Pollution, 9 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 21, 22 (2002) (“[Farmers] have not, however, been particularly good stewards of our
water resources: excessive or inappropriate use of fertilizers and pesticides, soil erosion, habitat
alteration, soil salinization, animal wastes, and rates of water usage are causing serious water
quality problems throughout the country. Indeed, agricultural nonpoint source pollution is
now considered the nation’s most persistent and most difficult water quality problem.”).
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Gulf shrimp than farmed shrimp,” however, the Minnesota farmer
decided to adjust his farming methods.10 He stopped tilling his land
in order to decrease nitrogen and phosphorus runoff. He planted
alfalfa along the edge of his farm—alfalfa is a “greedy” plant that
extracts most of the nitrogen and phosphorus before it gets to the
waterway. He also, rather cost-effectively, placed a bioreactor in the
ground near the stream that removes nitrates from the water.11 It
worked. The farmer’s yields actually went up, wildlife he had not
seen in years returned, and the water in the area became clearer.12
Until more farmers engage in similar conduct, however, Gulf
fishermen will not be happy. One commercial fisherman from
Louisiana colorfully declared, “you s[hit] in the river, then you s[hit]
down here . . . . They send us all the garbage; it comes down the
river to us,” to create what he called “the cesspool of the nation.”13
He continued, “The government ought to have a team of scientists
working on that. How bad are they going to let it get before
somebody stops it?”14 Ultimately, the article concluded that more
actions like those undertaken by the Minnesota farmer are necessary
to prevent further degradation of the Gulf, and that “cleaning up the
Gulf from the Midwest will require continental changes.”15
The story of the Minnesota farmer and the Gulf is emblematic of
one of the primary legal complications for addressing environmental
problems generally, and disasters like the Gulf dead zone specifically:
the constitutional division of regulatory authority between the
federal and state governments, or federalism. The federal
government does not currently regulate many land-use activities
related to farming, such as nonpoint source pollution from
agricultural sediment and fertilizer runoff, a situation that likely
results from the history of jurisprudence declaring that land-use
regulation is the “quintessential state and local power” under the
Constitution.16 In turn, states are doing little in the way of exercising
10. Sutter, supra note 2.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. State governments maintain the primary responsibility to regulate land use under
their authority to exercise the “police power” for protection of the “general welfare.” See
generally Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). Scholars have noted that “[t]he weight of
legal and political opinion holds that this allocation of power in [the U.S.] leaves the states in
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their quintessential regulatory role to curb land-based pollution of
the type affecting the Gulf. Thus in the Mississippi Valley we have a
quintessential commons—in the absence of coordination, either
among state and local governments or provided by a higher-level
authority, such as the federal government, individual subnational
governments refuse to address nonpoint source pollution, and their
collective inaction damages the shared Gulf resource.17 Indeed,
disaster law in the context of land use presents an ironic scenario, as
state and local governments resist federal involvement in land-use
decision-making,18 but after a major disaster occurs, state and local
officials declare, as did one official after Hurricane Andrew struck
Florida in 1992, “Where in the hell is the cavalry on this one?”19—
and all of the cavalry’s money too, of course. When such disasters
strike, the federal government may be called upon by any one of the
nearly 89,000 subnational governments20 for disaster relief, which
totals billions of dollars each year in the United States alone.21 A
common refrain is “why doesn’t the federal government do
something?” This is a completely justifiable question in the context
of coordinating disaster response since state and local governments

charge of regulating how private land is used,” JOHN R. NOLON, PATRICIA E. SALKIN &
MORTON GITELMAN, LAND USE AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 17 (7th ed. 2008), and
that “[l]and use law has always been a creature of state and local law,” Marci A. Hamilton,
Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 335 (2003). The U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized that “regulation of land use . . . is a quintessential state and local power.” Rapanos
v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006); see also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 768
n.30 (1982) (“[R]egulation of land use is perhaps the quintessential state activity.”).
17. See Blake Hudson, Federal Constitutions: The Keystone of Nested Commons
Governance, 63 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
18. Daniel D. Barnhizer, Givings Recapture: Funding Public Acquisition of Private
Property Interests on the Coasts, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 295, 339 (2003) (“[L]ocal
governments historically have zealously guarded local control over land use.”).
19. Thomas Birkland & Sarah Waterman, Is Federalism the Reason for Policy Failure in
Hurricane Katrina?, 38 PUBLIUS: J. OF FEDERALISM 692, 697 (2008), available at
http://www.mrterpak.com/uploads/5/1/5/9/5159930/is_federalism_the_reason_for_polic
y_failure_in_hurricane_katrina.pdf.
20. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2011, at
267 tbl.427 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/
11s0426.pdf.
21. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 3. Worldwide, the cost of disaster was below $25
billion annually in 1975, but was over $150 billion in 2005. See U.N. INT’L STRATEGY FOR
DISASTER REDUCTION, 2005 DISASTERS IN NUMBERS 1 (2005), available at
http://cnre.vt.edu/lsg/intro/2005-disaster-in-numbers.pdf.
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cannot be expected to have the manpower or resources to adequately
respond to such large-scale disasters.
Oftentimes, however, state and local governments are complicit
in the extent of a disaster’s human and economic costs because they
fail to mitigate those losses by engaging in more responsible,
environmentally conscious land-use planning. Take, for example, Bay
St. Louis, Mississippi officials who recently sought to remove
markers along the interstate denoting the high-water flood mark
reached during Hurricane Katrina.22 The extent of Katrina’s
destruction was in no small part due to urban and agricultural
development of floodplains that destroyed natural wetland buffer
systems. The floodwaters from Katrina in this particular area were so
high that they reached the overhead span where Interstate 10
crossed over another highway.23 Even so, a Bay St. Louis
councilmember believed that “the markers are detrimental to
attracting businesses that might want to relocate [in the area],
especially on undeveloped property around the interstate.”24 In fact,
“[s]ome city leaders envision the interstate property as a magnet that
will pull in restaurants, motels, and big-box retailers.”25 These
commercial establishments may very well be under water during the
next Katrina, but local government officials and economic
development interests want to keep that information hidden from
passersby. In this way communities often want the federal
government to bail them out of disaster crises that they themselves
are complicit in exacerbating.
Disaster Law and Policy scholars have recognized that rising
disaster risks and costs are largely associated with “land use planning
that exacerbates, rather than mitigates, disaster risk.”26 Despite this
recognition, scholars have not provided a holistic framework within
which to assess how land-use-related federalism issues might best be
resolved to aid disaster mitigation and prevention. A holistic
theoretical assessment is warranted especially because society

22. The Associated Press, Bay St. Louis Officials Oppose Hurricane Katrina High-Water
Markers on Highway, NOLA.COM (July 23, 2011, 9:00 PM), http://www.nola.com/
katrina/index.ssf/2011/07/bay_st_louis_officials_oppose.html.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 10.
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continues to witness an increase in disasters associated with land use
as population grows and the land base is further developed.
Not only do well-recognized land-use-related disasters need to
be studied more holistically, but society also faces a variety of new
disaster challenges for which it must formulate policy responses. For
example, how does sea-level rise associated with climate change shift
the debate about the appropriate role of the federal government in
land-use planning in coastal areas likely to be inundated? Should the
federal government leave it to state and local governments alone to
resolve, even if greater long-term costs will accrue to the federal
government in response efforts? Or should the federal government
have a greater say in land-use decision making in order to mitigate
the devastating effects of sea level rise along the coast? Similarly,
society continues to gain new insights into well-recognized land-userelated disasters that call for innovative policy responses. For
example, wetlands along the coast of Louisiana have long been
subject to a certain level of federal regulatory involvement, primarily
in the form of the Clean Water Act’s 404 wetland fill permitting
program.27 Hurricane Katrina, however, exposed more clearly than
ever the impacts, social and economic, of aggregated individual land
development projects facilitated by state and local planning that filled
in wetlands and destroyed a key hurricane buffer system. This raises
questions about how seriously we have taken the role of the federal
government in staving off those types of disasters, especially
considering the Army Corps of Engineers high issuance rate of
wetland fill permits.28 The same can be said for the development of
floodplains along the Mississippi River that have greatly exacerbated
the destruction caused by flood events.
Ultimately, though scholars have discussed how federalism has
complicated disaster response, due to questions of appropriate
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006).
28. The Corps receives an average of over 80,000 permit requests annually; of these,
only about 9% are required to go through a “detailed evaluation for an individual permit”;
most are approved through a nationwide or region-specific permit. Of the 9% that have to file
for an individual permit, less than 0.3% are denied. In Louisiana alone, between 1988 and
1996, 99% of all permit applications were granted, including 92% in flood disaster areas.
Brandee Ketchum, Note, Like the Swamp Thing: Something Ambiguous Rises From the Hidden
Depths of Murky Waters—The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Murky Wet Land in Rapanos v.
United States, 68 LA. L. REV. 983, 1011–12 (2008) (footnotes omitted). In addition, the
EPA only exercised its power to veto the Corps wetland permitting eleven times between 1972
and 2007. CRAIG PITTMAN & MATTHEW WAITE, PAVING PARADISE: FLORIDA'S VANISHING
WETLANDS AND THE FAILURE OF NO NET LOSS 167 (2009).
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jurisdiction, lack of coordinated response, and similar difficulties
created by multiple jurisdictions attempting to provide relief after
disaster strikes,29 this Article seeks to provide a holistic theoretical
framework within which to address problems of land-use-related
disaster mitigation and prevention. Part II provides a brief overview
of various disasters that implicate direct land-use planning, currently
considered the sole regulatory purview of state and local
governments, and then categorizes these disasters along a spectrum
from “transitory” to “perpetual,” to provide a mechanism for
assessing which types of disasters might warrant greater federal
involvement relative to subnational controls. While this overview
does not constitute an exhaustive list, it does provide a foundation
for categorizing land-use-related disasters for more comprehensive
future study. In addition, this discussion recognizes that both federal
and subnational policy components need adjusting to formulate
effective disaster mitigation and prevention policies related to landuse planning, as the federal, state, and local governments are
complicit in either establishing policies promoting poor land-use
planning or not intervening with more stringent land-use planning
standards. Part III begins with a discussion of the “Bimodal
Federalism” framework which more appropriately captures the
current scope of respective federal-state regulatory roles by
integrating the dynamic theory of federalism with remnant dualist
notions of federalism that still impact land-use law and policy across
governance scales. Part III then discusses the available methods for
“reconstituting federalism” for these different categories of disaster
considering the bimodal federalism framework—that is, positing
cursory hypotheses regarding both the need for and the most
constitutionally viable means of gaining greater federal inputs into
certain categories of land-use-related disaster mitigation and
prevention. Part IV concludes.
II. DISASTERS THAT IMPLICATE LAND-USE PLANNING AND THE
TRANSITORY-PERPETUAL DISASTER SPECTRUM
A variety of disasters implicate land-use planning, which has long
been considered the exclusive constitutional purview of state and
local governments. These disasters may be placed along a spectrum
from transitory to perpetual. Transitory disasters occur periodically
29. See generally Birkland & Waterman, supra note 19.

1999

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/20/2011 2:51 PM

2011

and have effects that are generally limited to smaller geographic
scales, with fewer jurisdictional spillover effects. On the other end of
the spectrum are perpetual disasters, which may be gradual but are
continual, making it exceedingly difficult to see their effects across
narrow temporal scales—even though they eventually lead to crises
and destruction of nationwide effect. As a result, these disasters have
far greater jurisdictional spillover effects and nationwide implications.
Some disasters fall within a “gray area” between the transitory and
perpetual ends of the spectrum, due to greater frequency or
durational impact, or both. For example, these disasters may
technically be transitory, in that there is a temporal break between
disaster events, but they can occur so frequently as to mimic
perpetual disasters and can recur for a long enough period of time to
cause nationwide impacts and warrant greater national interest. An
example would be Gulf hurricanes, which, over decades, occur with
regularity and often lead to enormous federal government
expenditures in the form of disaster relief. Similarly, some disasters
may only occur once, or far less often than do “pure” transitory
disasters, but the durational impact is of a tremendous magnitude
with nationwide implications. An example would be an explosion or
reactor failure at a nuclear plant. Each of these different types of
“gray area” disasters along the spectrum operate for a conceptually
severed period of time just like perpetual disasters, with long-lasting
aftereffects. And, of course, a disaster can both be of the high
frequency variety and have great durational impact, like Hurricane
Katrina.
To be clear, the groups into which these disasters are categorized
are not mutually exclusive, and the categorization of each depends
upon the case-specific circumstances presented over time regarding
any one type of disaster. In addition, the disasters themselves are not
mutually exclusive in occurrence, meaning that hurricanes cause
flooding; hurricanes and earthquakes can cause nuclear plant
incidents; heat waves can cause fires; and climate change contributes
to sea-level rise, the spread of invasive species, the frequency and
severity of hurricane events, and localized heat waves. The
categorization undertaken below, therefore, is merely meant to
provide a general framework within which to analyze which disaster
events might require greater federal inputs into land-use planning for
disaster mitigation and prevention and the most constitutionally
viable mechanisms for doing so.
2000
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A. Transitory Disasters

1. Localized flooding
The best means of limiting flood damages to human development is to keep the
development away from high-risk areas.30

Localized flooding has plagued civilization for as long as there
have been permanent settlements. Societies require access to water to
survive. As a result, early settlement patterns along river courses, near
bays and estuaries, within other watersheds, and along the coast
remain with us today.31 To obtain the rewards that accompany living
in these areas, societies also must live with the risks, including
flooding. Floods cause more damage in the aggregate than virtually
any other natural disaster.32 Measurable flood-related losses are now
greater than $4 billion a year.33
As with most disasters, the structure of modern society has
exacerbated flood risks and costs. The simple math of rising
populations means more people live in flood-prone areas. In
addition, urban development and the human-built environment have
further intensified flood damages. Not only does development
increase the amount of impermeable surface in an area, thus
“increasing the quantity and speed of runoff from rain and melting
snow . . .”,34 but it also eliminates floodplains and wetlands that
would otherwise absorb floodwaters.35 The risks of flooding will only
increase as populations increase. Currently there are over 125 million
housing units in the United States, with all the attendant impervious
surfaces (such as roofs and parking lots) that contribute to flooding
(and pollutant) disasters.36 By 2040, the United States will need 70

30. Barnhizer, supra note 18, at 337.
31. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 23.
32. See Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program and
Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 62 (1985) (“Flooding is the most frequent and the most
costly natural catastrophe in the United States, if not the world. Nine of every ten natural
disasters in this country are flood-related.”).
33. Barnhizer, supra note 18, at 306.
34. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 24.
35. U.N. INT’L STRATEGY FOR DISASTER REDUCTION, 2009 GLOBAL ASSESSMENT
REPORT ON DISASTER RISK REDUCTION: RISK AND POVERTY IN A CHANGING CLIMATE 72
(2009),
available
at
http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/gar/report/
documents/GAR_Chapter_3_2009_eng.pdf.
36. Arthur C. Nelson & Robert E. Lang, The Next 100 Million, 73 PLAN. 4, 4 (2007).
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million more housing units, and 40 million of these will be built on
new residential lots.37
As discussed below in Part II.C, it is true that flooding events in
certain large watersheds might more appropriately fit in the gray area
between transitory and perpetual disasters. Furthermore, localized
flooding is directly related to other “gray area” and perpetual
disasters discussed below, such as hurricanes and sea-level rise. Yet,
due to the typically localized nature of day-to-day weather patterns,
most flooding events are limited in geographic and jurisdictional
scope. As a result, land-use planning standards of local governments,
which are ultimately directed (or not directed) at the state level, have
the potential to either mitigate or exacerbate localized flooding
events occurring within jurisdictional boundaries.
In addition to the Bay St. Louis example highlighted in the
Introduction, consider the severe flooding in Missouri in 1993.
Missouri spent the next ten years facilitating $2.2 billion of
investment into new development on land that had been underwater
during the floods. To this day, Missouri does not maintain
comprehensive floodplain management legislation, and local officials
“are attracted to the clarion call of tax revenue and job creation.”38
One local Missouri councilwoman exhibited a “race-to-the-bottom”
mentality by stating her community had “in the past . . . hugged a
lot of trees, and we’ve lost out on a lot of development. We’re going
to be surrounded by businesses while we’re looking at flood plain.”39
Missouri not only passively refused to intervene in the
development of floodplains, but it has actively encouraged new
development in floodplains by funding the construction of new
levees. This is despite the “virtual consensus among floodplain
managers that current floodplain management relies too much on
structural solutions”—that is, building codes and additional levees—
rather than “nonstructural solutions,” such as prohibitions on
development or even relocation of some communities out of flood
zones.40 As a result, “[s]tricter, wiser land use restrictions are widely

37. Id.
38. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 34–35 (citing Christopher Carey, Cities Look to
Flood Plains for Jobs, Growth, Tax Dollars, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 29, 2003, at A1).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 28.
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viewed as the most critical and indispensable element of effective
floodplain management moving forward.”41
The responsibility for localized flooding exacerbated by humanbuilt capital is not limited to subnational governments. Rather, it is
shared with the federal government. Indeed, “private decisions to
live and work in hazardous locations are shaped by local land use
policies, and those local land use decisions are, in turn, heavily
influenced by state and federal incentives.”42 Missouri’s investment in
the levee system was actually subsidized by the federal government,
and such subsidies have historically been the typical federal
contribution to floodplain management. In Missouri’s case, federal
government representatives stated, “‘[w]e don’t make a value
judgment on whether that property should be protected . . . . As
long as people can show they can meet the requirements, they’ll get
a permit, whether we like building in the flood plain or not.’”43
As Professor Barnhizer has argued, governments at all levels
continue to “expend hundreds of millions of dollars annually to
repair repeated and foreseeable damage to unwise and unsustainable
private development and public infrastructure and facilities. Instead
of limiting flood-plain development, those policies and practices
continue to maintain development against rising sea levels, climate
change, extreme weather phenomena, and erosion.”44 Barnhizer cites
flood insurance, construction of flood control structures like levees
and dams, and “liberal” disaster relief policies as warping risk
perceptions and, in turn, warping the value of property in
floodplains.45 Property values are artificially inflated, making it much
more expensive for the government to pay “just compensation” if it
decides to purchase property to recapture flood control values and
mitigate flood damage. In other words, “[t]hese artificially enhanced

41. Id. Floodplain managers have argued that “avoidance of floodprone and/or
ecologically sensitive areas should be axiomatic in planning new development . . . . We need to
begin a pattern of gradual and voluntary resettlement of those portions of communities that
already have been located in the highest-risk or most ecologically sensitive areas . . . .” ASS’N
OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT 2050, at 33 (2007).
42. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 25–26.
43. Sara Shipley, Unprecedented Growth in the Flood Plain Brings Riches and Risks;
Business Grows on Land Under Water 10 Years Ago, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 27,
2003, at A1 (quoting Alan Dooley, a spokesman for the Army Corps of Engineers’ St. Louis
District).
44. Barnhizer, supra note 18, at 296.
45. Id. at 296–97.
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values result in a form of ‘double dipping’ by landowners. . . . Such
double-dipping dramatically increases government costs of floodplain
management by requiring double payments, both for ineffective past
flood responses and for the costs of correcting those past mistakes
through property acquisition.”46
Another example of the federal government’s complicity in
exacerbating localized flood risk and destruction related to land-use
planning is the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). After
Hurricane Ivan, the federal government encouraged residents to
rebuild in disaster prone areas by paying out $15 million through the
NFIP; after Katrina, the amount increased to $44 million.47 The
NFIP mandates artificial insurance rates which are “not actuarially
based [and] have subsidized development in hazardous areas [] by
ensuring that developers can build in floodplains confident that they
can obtain relatively low-cost, below market insurance against any
flood risks.”48 Indeed, the complicity of both the federal and state
governments in exacerbating disaster risks and costs is a theme that
runs throughout nearly every category of disaster discussed below, as
“state and federal land use and development policies that have
fostered improper rebuilding back in hazardous areas and impede
prospects for sensible, local, predisaster planning.”49
2. Fires
Forest and brush fires are also typically disasters with more
localized effects. Thus, land-use policies related to zoning of
residential and commercial development can impact the degree of
harm and costs caused by fire events. State forest and brush
management standards can also play a role, as they may or may not
dictate rules regarding prescribed burns or other methods of
removing copious quantities of fuel that can build up and make fires
far more severe.

46. Id. at 297 (footnote omitted) (quoting Edward Thompson, Jr., The Government
Giveth, ENVTL. FORUM, Mar.–Apr. 1994, at 22, 26).
47. Kevin Ramakrishna, Comment, Subduing the Ceaseless Storm: Breaking the BuildDestroy-Rebuild Cycle Following Major Catastrophes Through Taxation and Responsibility, 2
ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 328, 341 (2009).
48. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 32.
49. Philip R. Berke & Thomas J. Campanella, Planning for Postdisaster Resiliency, 604
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 192, 195 (2006).
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Sometimes policies placing development in or around fire-prone
areas and methods for controlling fires can converge in a negative
way—especially when neither is carried out effectively. For instance,
a controlled burn in New Mexico in May 2000 raged out of control,
largely because it was started during a severe drought and when
winds were high. The damage from the fire was greater than it might
have otherwise been because of its proximity to the city of Los
Alamos.50 The fire destroyed or damaged more than 439 homes,
numerous businesses, and 7 million trees, resulting in an estimated
$1 billion in total damages.51 Furthermore, more than 1000 families
suffered damages, while approximately 18,000 residents were forced
to evacuate.52 As Farber et al. note,
The proximity of communities to wildlands puts those
communities at risk for catastrophic fires and limits options for
wildland fire management by increasing the riskiness of prescribed
burns and by pressuring [managers] to suppress all fires on
wildlands that threaten urban development, even when good forest
management practices dictate allowing the fire to burn to reduce
the risk of more catastrophic fires.53

Yet we continue to build in fire-prone areas. By 2030, the fireprone areas of the western Rocky Mountains are expected to see the
construction of 2.2 million new homes.54 And, once again, as with
flooding, we see federal and state complicity in undermining effective
disaster mitigation and prevention policies. State and local
governments expect the federal government to throw money at fire
suppression programs, even when subnational governments’ failure
to exercise their constitutional regulatory authority over zoning
increases federal fire suppression costs, which are already nearing $1
billion annually.55 Ultimately, without federal inputs into land-use
planning related to fire risk, we must rely on the volition of state and
local governments and private individuals to make responsible
residential and commercial development choices, even though these
entities “have done little to protect themselves.”56 As a result,
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 44.
Id.
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“[m]andatory zoning and building regulations may be needed to
compel landowners to take the actions necessary to protect their
homes and property from wildfire.”57
One last point should be made regarding fire-related land-use
planning. Demonstrating the generally more localized geographic
nature of wildfires, wildfire disasters are by and large limited to much
drier western state jurisdictions west of the 100th meridian, which
splits the state of Texas, and the rest of the country, into a “dry”
western half and a “wet” eastern half.58 So, while the southeastern
United States, for example, has some of the least stringent forest
management standards in the world,59 including lax standards related
to fuel removal, such standards may be less necessary considering the
reduced likelihood of fire. Even so, and especially in a time of climate
change, fires do occur in the Southeast and may occur with
increasing frequency. The recent wildfire in Gulf Shores, Alabama,
for which a state of emergency was declared, resulted in requests for
both state and federal funds to address the disaster.60 Similarly, fires
on the “wet” side of Texas have recently burned thousands of acres
and threatened both residents and municipalities, destroying
hundreds of homes and taking numerous lives.61
3. Heat waves
Impervious surfaces and other attributes of the human-built
environment contribute to more than just flood-related disaster
events. Urban development in the form of rooftops, roadways, and
parking lots can also increase the ambient temperatures of a
location—an effect known as the “urban heat island.” The urban
57. Id.
58. JAMES RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN & MARK SQUILLACE, NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW AND POLICY 745 (2d ed. 2009).
59. See CONSTANCE L. MCDERMOTT, BENJAMIN CASHORE & PETER KANOWSKI,
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL FOREST POLICIES: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 327 (Jeffrey
A. Sayer ed., 2010).
60. Libby Amos, State of Emergency Declared for Baldwin Co., FOX10TV (last updated
June
28,
2011,
8:38
AM),
http://www.fox10tv.com/dpp/news/local_news/
baldwin_county/state-of-emergency-declared-for-baldwin-co.
61. See, e.g., CNN Wire Staff, Wildfires Rip Through Sun-Scorched Texas, CNN (Sept. 5,
2011, 10:56 PM), http://tinyurl.com/4yhby2f; 30 Homes Destroyed in Grimes County Fire,
THE EAGLE (June 20, 2011, 3:28 PM), http://www.theeagle.com/local/30-homesdestroyed-in-BV-fire; Matthew Watkins, Grimes County Fire Burns 5,000 Acres; Leaves ‘Total
Devastation’, TEXAS FIRE (June 21, 2011), http://www.texas-fire.com/2011/06/grimescounty-fire-burns-5000-acres-leaves-total-devastation/.
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heat island effect “can elevate the temperature of ‘paved over’ urban
areas more than twenty-two degrees Fahrenheit over surrounding
rural areas” and “can increase the risk of heat waves, already one of
the most deadly natural hazards.”62
On a hot, sunny summer day, surfaces such as roofs and
pavement can be 50 to 90 degrees Fahrenheit hotter than the
surrounding air,63 while shaded or moist surfaces found in more rural
settings remain close to air temperatures.64 The average difference in
daytime surface temperatures in rural versus urban areas is 18 to 27
degrees Fahrenheit,65 and the mean air temperature in large cities
may be 1.8 to 5.4 degrees Fahrenheit warmer than surrounding
undeveloped areas.66
Urban heat islands lead to a variety of ills, including increased
energy consumption, increased emissions of air pollutants and
greenhouse gases, negative human health effects, and impaired water
quality. Heat islands can lead to disaster during extreme heat waves,
especially since increased demand for cooling may overload electrical
generation systems. In 1995, a summer heat wave in the Midwest
caused more than one thousand deaths.67 Indeed, the Center for
Disease Control and Prevention estimates that “from 1979 to 1999,
excessive heat exposure contributed to more than 8,000 premature
deaths in the United States . . . exceed[ing] the number of
mortalities resulting from hurricanes, lightning, tornadoes, floods,
and earthquakes combined.”68
State and local governments may implement a variety of
strategies to address urban heat islands. They can zone both
commercial and residential developments to include more trees and
vegetation. Trees help regulate temperature by trapping moisture
62. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 24 (citing EPA, Heat Island Effect, EPA.GOV (last
updated Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.epa.gov/hiri/ and Kevin A. Borden & Susan L. Cutter,
Spatial Patterns of Natural Hazards Mortality in the United States, 7 INT’L J. HEALTH
GEOGRAPHICS 64 (2008)).
63. EPA, REDUCING URBAN HEAT ISLANDS: COMPENDIUM OF STRATEGIES: URBAN
HEAT ISLAND BASICS 2 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/heatisland/
resources/pdf/BasicsCompendium.pdf.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1.
67. Id. at 14 (citation omitted).
68. Id. at 15 (citing Extreme Heat: A Prevention Guide to Promote Your Personal Health
and Safety, CDC (last updated July 31, 2009), http://www.bt.cdc.gov/disasters/
extremeheat/heat_guide.asp).
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and cooling the earth’s surface.69 As a result, trees are an efficient and
cost-effective energy conservation option, and have been called
“nature’s air conditioners.”70 A single tree “can transpire 100 gallons
of water from its leaves per day. The cooling provided by this
amount of evaporation would be equivalent to five average room air
conditioners running 20 hours per day.”71
The average homeowner can harness the services provided by
trees to save up to 20 percent on annual air conditioning costs.72 As
a personal anecdote, I never considered that one type of urban
sprawl could be so much superior to another until I moved from
Houston, Texas to Florida. Houston has no zoning and largely no
trees breaking the seemingly unending pavement of commercial
parking lots, but in Florida many, if not most, municipalities require
trees and other greenery to be incorporated into commercial
developments. In August it makes a difference.
One study found that cities that purposefully incorporate trees
into land-use planning may accrue benefits of over four dollars for
every dollar invested.73 In addition to incorporating greater amounts
of natural capital into urban developments, state and local
governments can implement land-use planning that incorporates
green roofs, cool roofs, and cool pavements into commercial and
residential developments. These emerging technologies have been
increasingly touted as mechanisms to reduce higher temperatures
associated with the urban heat island effect.74
B. Perpetual Disasters
1. Sea-level rise
Sea-level rise is perhaps the quintessential perpetual disaster, and
scholars have highlighted that climate change, the source of more
rapid sea-level rise in the recent past and future, may be
69. RASBAND ET AL., supra note 58, at 1208.
70. TIVON E. FEELEY & PAUL H. WRAY, IOWA STATE UNIV., UNIV. EXTENSION,
FORESTRY EXTENSION NOTES: ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF WOODY VEGETATION 1 (Aug.
2005), available at http://tinyurl.com/6pq32tl.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2.
73. KELAINE E. VARGAS ET AL., USDA, INTERIOR WEST COMMUNITY TREE GUIDE:
BENEFITS,
COSTS,
AND
STRATEGIC
PLANTING
39
(2007)
available
at
http://www.fs.fed.us/psw/publications/documents/psw_gtr205/psw_gtr205.pdf.
74. Id. at 5.
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characterized as nothing more than “a slow-moving disaster.”75 Sealevel rise is indeed a slow process, and plays out incrementally over
human life spans. Over the past century, sea levels rose .17 meters,76
a rate of roughly 1.7 mm/year. Yet satellite imagery demonstrates
that the rate increased to 3.1 mm/year between 1993 and 2003.77
This increased rate corresponds with increases in atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases and temperatures; thus, the
future impact of a changing climate on sea levels is highly variable. A
recent report noted that “[p]rojections of sea-level rise for the
twenty-first century vary widely, ranging from several centimeters to
more than a meter.”78 Given increasing global temperatures and the
rapid loss of Arctic and Antarctic ice sheets, however, these estimates
may very well be revised upward.79 Ultimately, “warming and sealevel rise will continue for more than a millennium, even if carbon
dioxide concentrations are stabilized, due to the long time required
to remove this gas from the atmosphere.”80 As a result, “rising sea
levels . . . will ensure increased damage along increasingly developed
shorelines,”81 as rising seas “inundate low areas and increase
flooding, coastal erosion, wetlands loss, and saltwater intrusion into
estuaries and freshwater aquifers.”82 Rising sea levels “interact with
tides and storms to create more destructive impacts, as extreme high
water levels occur with more frequency.”83
Around fifty-eight thousand square kilometers of coastline along
the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico lie less than 1.5 meters above
sea level. More than 80 percent of these low-lying areas are in the
states of Louisiana, Florida, Texas, and North Carolina, with North
Carolina alone having as much land within one meter of sea level as

75. JOSH EAGLE & MEG CALDWELL, COASTAL LAW 31 (2011).
76. Christophe A.G. Tulou et al., Climate Change and the Marine Environment, in
OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND POLICY 571, 575 (Donald C. Baur, Tim Eichenberg &
Michael Sutton eds., 2008).
77. Id.
78. U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM & THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON GLOBAL
CHANGE RESEARCH, COASTAL SENSITIVITY TO SEA-LEVEL RISE: A FOCUS ON THE MIDATLANTIC REGION IX (2009) [hereinafter U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM],
http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap4-1/final-report/default.htm#finalreport.
79. Tulou et al., supra note 76, at 575.
80. Id. at 576.
81. Id. at 578.
82. U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM, supra note 78, at IX.
83. Tulou et al., supra note 76, at 578.
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the Netherlands.84 In fact, “Atlantic and Gulf Coast shorelines are
especially vulnerable to long term sea-level rise . . . the slope of these
areas is so gentle that a small rise in sea level produces a large inland
shift of the shoreline.”85 Eighty-five coastal counties along the east
coast contain approximately 1,600 square kilometers of land that lie
less than a meter above current sea levels—placing roughly 4,800
kilometers of roads and roughly 388,000 people at risk.86 By 2060,
coastal erosion alone will have threatened nearly 87,000 homes
along U.S. coasts.87 A government study of the city of Boston, where
sea levels could rise as much as a meter in the next one hundred
years, determined that even the mildest predictions for sea-level rise
and climate change might leave “Massachusetts General Hospital,
the Public Garden, the Esplanade, and MIT in a pool of water after a
strong storm surge in the harbor.”88 Without appropriate
adjustments to land-use planning and structural requirements, flood
damage in Boston alone would be in the ballpark of $57 billion over
the next one hundred years, an amount $26 billion more than would
occur without climate change and sea-level rise impacts.89
These dangers are not limited, however, to the Gulf and Atlantic
states. In California, a mere twelve-inch rise in sea level would shift
flood events caused by 100-year-storm surges to once every ten
years.90 Storm modeling along the San Diego coast found that
without sea-level rise there would be roughly ten extreme weather
events between 2070–2100, but “[o]ver the same time period there
would be approximately 330 extreme events with a rise in sea level of
twenty centimeters, 2,300 extreme events with a rise of forty
centimeters, and almost 19,000 events with a rise of eighty
centimeters.”91
Sea levels rising at exponential rates (over geologic time scales)
will meet head-on with a rush of humans heading at exponential
rates right into the face of the disaster—an ironic scenario that
84. Id.
85. EAGLE & CALDWELL, supra note 75, at 25.
86. Id.
87. Tulou et al., supra note 76, at 578–79.
88. Susan Milligan, Study Predicts City Flood Threat Due to Warming, BOS. GLOBE, Feb.
15, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2005/02/15/
study_predicts_city_flood_threat_due_to_warming/.
89. Id.
90. Tulou et al., supra note 76, at 578.
91. Id.
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demonstrates the circular nature of human psychology related to
disasters. Humans exacerbate climate change through carbon
emissions, and as a result sea levels rise; then humans move in
disproportionate numbers into areas likely to be inundated by rising
sea levels; then society expects a system of disaster law and policy to
alleviate their difficulties after disaster strikes. Over the last three
decades, nearly half of all new construction in the United States has
been in the coastal zone,92 and approximately 53 percent of the total
U.S. population lives on the 17 percent of land in the coastal zone.93
By 2000, counties along the coast had more than four times the
population density of counties further inland.94 By 2020 an
additional twenty-seven million people are expected to call the coast
home.95
Ultimately, sea-level rise is a prime example of a slow-moving but
perpetual disaster that has broad interjurisdictional and nationwide
impacts, and one that synergizes with other disasters like hurricanes
and flood events to wreak havoc on the human-built environment—
especially in the absence of innovative and responsible land-use
planning. In fact, perpetual disasters are arguably even more
dangerous than transitory disasters, at least in the sense of failing to
spur human action. The full magnitude of harm becomes apparent
and observable only when temporally aggregated and spread out
over periods of time that exceed any single generation’s life span. As
a result, it is difficult to forge collective action to avoid the disaster.
As Professor Buzbee has noted, “[a] sudden disaster or perceived
crisis is often essential to rouse the populace and give politicians
reasons to take on issues of harms caused by industry and the process
of real estate development.”96 Yet perpetual disasters are by
definition not “sudden,” thus masking the crisis. As discussed next,

92. Barnhizer, supra note 18, at 308.
93. EAGLE & CALDWELL, supra note 75, at 25.
94. Id. at 33.
95. Barnhizer, supra note 18, at 311. Sea-level rise is not only a slow-moving disaster
threatening humans and human-made capital; it also threatens important ecosystems already
under strain. Eleven of the twenty-five most endangered ecosystems in the United States are
coastal ecosystems. REED F. NOSS, EDWARD T. LAROE III. & J. MICHAEL SCOTT,
ENDANGERED ECOSYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF LOSS
AND DEGRADATION (1995), http://biology.usgs.gov/pubs/ecosys.htm.
96. William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional
Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 129–130 (1999).

2011

DO NOT DELETE

12/20/2011 2:51 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2011

nonpoint pollution of vast watersheds like the Mississippi River
Valley provides yet another example of a slow-moving disaster.
2. Gulf/bay pollution and eutrophication from nonpoint runoff
Nonpoint source water pollution from land-use-related
agricultural activities “is now considered the nation’s most persistent
and most difficult water quality problem.”97 Over 1.9 million U.S.
farms cover nearly half of all the land in the nation.98 In 1998,
agricultural runoff was a primary contributor to the degradation of
59 percent of river miles, 31 percent of impaired lake waters, and 15
percent of impaired estuarine waters.99 Sedimentation, toxic
chemicals such as Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs), mercury,
pesticides, hydrocarbons, and, of course, excess fertilizers and animal
wastes containing nitrogen and phosphorus plague waters in these
watersheds.100 The interjurisdictional impacts are profound.
Nonpoint runoff from agricultural, construction, forestry, and urban
development activities sends sediment downstream that results in
dredging costs of $1 billion a year for harbors and reservoirs.101 In
addition to the Gulf dead zone highlighted in the introduction,
nearly half of all estuaries in the United States contain hypoxic zones
due to phosphorus and nitrogen pollution.102 Nonpoint runoff
aggregates at its final point of destination to destroy coral reefs and
poison fisheries either directly or through the process of
bioaccumulation.103 There are further biological vector impacts, as
runoff has resulted in the outbreak of microorganisms that attack
and kill both fish and humans in the Chesapeake Bay, the Neuse
River of North Carolina, and the Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
watershed.104
Despite widespread interjurisdictional impacts and the
nationwide concerns raised by nonpoint water pollution, the federal
government does not regulate agricultural nonpoint source water
97. Williams, supra note 9, at 22.
98. Id. at 44.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 46.
101. Robin Kundis Craig, Local or National? The Increasing Federalization of Nonpoint
Source Pollution Regulation, 15 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 179, 213 (2000).
102. Id.
103. See RASBAND ET AL., supra note 58, at 456.
104. Craig, supra note 101, at 214.
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pollution under the Clean Water Act (CWA). Again, this hesitancy is
due in part to conceptions of exclusive state and local authority over
land uses,105 leaving states as the “exclusive regulators of nonpoint
source pollution.”106 States, meanwhile, are doing very little to
exercise their regulatory authority.107 As Professor Craig has noted,
“[s]o long as Congress operates within constitutional federalism
requirements, its statutory judgment calls are subject to revision if
new information or awareness indicates that the initial statutory
division of power incorrectly reflects the true balance of the national
and local interests at stake.”108 The CWA’s point source/nonpoint
source distinction constitutes one such potential misjudgment, as the
interstate commercial impacts of nonpoint water pollution are
becoming ever clearer, thus rendering a point source/nonpoint
source distinction increasingly inconsequential under Commerce
Clause analysis.
Though the CWA does contain nonprescriptive provisions that
might be harnessed to address or encourage greater control over
nonpoint pollution,109 neither the CWA nor other programs have
“translated into either widespread demonstrable results or clearly
defined, coherent regulatory programs,” leading to calls for an
increased federal presence in the form of minimum federal standards
with a great degree of flexibility available to the states in
implementation.110 Such standards would address the problem of
state-level inaction as well as foster more efficient coordination
considering the large-scale interjurisdictional impacts along
watersheds like the Mississippi and the Gulf of Mexico.111 To the
extent that such standards might involve greater federal inputs into
state land-use planning within potentially affected watersheds, it is
necessary to consider a reconstitution of federalism principles.

105. See Williams, supra note 9, at 27 (“The practices that contribute most to nonpoint
source pollution are patterns of land use, the control of which has been guarded jealously by
local government authorities, making direct federal control at best a touchy political
proposition. Current federal programs to control nonpoint source pollution are the product of
judgments that controls of this sort should remain with state and local authorities, as has been
the traditional practice.” (footnote omitted)).
106. See Craig, supra note 101, at 179.
107. Williams, supra note 9, at 23.
108. Craig, supra note 101, at 181.
109. See Williams, supra note 9, at 67–91.
110. Id. at 25–29.
111. Id.
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3. Invasive species
At first blush, invasive species may not seem like a perpetual
disaster. Yet, the persistent rates at which invasive species spread and
their wide-scale interjurisdictional economic and other impacts justify
this categorization under many circumstances. Estimates in the year
2000 were that the United States suffers $137 billion a year in
agricultural losses, infrastructure damage, management, and other
costs associated with invasive species.112 The estimated cost of
managing just one invasive species, zebra mussels, in the Great Lakes
between 2000 and 2010 was nearly $5 billion.113 Invasive species
also exacerbate other categories and types of disaster, such as
transitory fires. For example, Tucson, Arizona, has experienced
increased invasion from nonnative vegetation that has
“transform[ed] fire-resistant desert into highly flammable
grassland.”114
Invasive species not only wreak havoc on human development
activities, but also give rise to a variety of natural capital costs. Up to
46 percent of plants and animals listed on the Endangered Species
Act have been negatively impacted by invasives.115 Furthermore,
invasive species’ interjurisdictional scope is profound. Invasive plants
alone infest 100 million acres in the United States, and each year
they spread an additional 3 million acres.116
President Clinton issued an executive order in 1999 establishing
a National Invasive Species Council.117 In 2000, the regulatory
agencies that make up the council spent approximately $632 million
to combat invasive species.118 Though the federal and state
governments and international forums have set their sights on
invasive species through a variety of legislative and other programs
112. NAT’L INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL, MEETING THE INVASIVE SPECIES CHALLENGE
8 (2001), available at http://www.invasivespeciesinfo.gov/docs/council/mpfinal.pdf; Flynn
Boonstra, Note, Leading by Example: A Comparison of New Zealand's and the United States'
Invasive Species Policies, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1188 (2011). A single species of termite
costs the city of New Orleans $300 million annually. NAT’L INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL,
supra, at 2.
113. Jason A. Boothe, Comment, Defending the Homeland: A Call to Action in the War
Against Aquatic Invasive Species, 21 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 407, 412 (2008).
114. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 6–7.
115. NAT’L INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL, supra note 112, at 2.
116. Id. at 11.
117. Exec. Order No. 13,112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6183, 6184 (1999).
118. NAT’L INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL, supra note 112, at 18.
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dating at least as far back as the Lacey Act of 1900,119 problems
persist and appear to be getting worse.120
Some invasive species implicate land-use planning that currently
falls within the exclusive regulatory ambit of state and local
governments, like the crafting of private forest management
standards.121 Exclusive state regulatory control over such standards
gives further cause for concern, as most states have been unable to
formulate robust approaches to managing the entire suite of invasive
species that pose threats to the country.122 This indicates that greater
federal inputs may be needed to address the problems associated
with widespread and extremely destructive invasive species.
An example of such a species is cogongrass, which has gripped
the southeastern United States. Cogongrass is “an aggressive invader
of natural and disturbed areas throughout the Southeast. It disrupts
ecosystem functions, reduces wildlife habitat, decreases tree seedling
growth and establishment success, and alters fire regimes and
intensity.”123 Scientists have noted that the grass has placed the
southeastern United States in a “crisis.”124 Over one million acres of
the state of Florida is plagued by cogongrass, with tens of thousands
more acres present in each of six other states. The grass spreads at a
rate of thousands of additional acres each year.125 Most of the
Eastern United States and even the Pacific Northwest states are
considered vulnerable to its spread. Scientists have argued that “[t]he
invasion of cogongrass appears facilitated by dynamics in this era of
rapid global warming, increased air pollution with higher carbon
dioxide levels, human encroachment with wildland fragmentation,
and solidifying urbanization with a population indifferent to the land
base that supports them. These conditions favor cogongrass
119. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378 (2006); see also National Invasive Species Act, 16
U.S.C.A. §§ 4701–4715 (West 2010) (this act, however, is very limited in scope); 3
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 21:7 (2011).
120. NAT’L INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL, supra note 112, at 10–12.
121. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
122. See Boonstra, supra note 112, at 1200–07.
123. C.W. EVANS ET AL., U.S. FOREST SERV., FIELD GUIDE TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF
COGONGRASS: WITH COMPARISON TO OTHER COMMONLY FOUND GRASS SPECIES IN THE
SOUTHEAST (2006), available at http://www.cogongrass.org/cogongrassid.pdf.
124. James H. Miller, The Context of the South’s Cogongrass Crisis, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE REGIONAL COGONGRASS CONFERENCE: A COGONGRASS MANAGEMENT GUIDE 6, 6
(Nancy J. Loewenstein & James H. Miller eds., 2007) [hereinafter COGONGRASS
CONFERENCE].
125. Id.
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invasions.”126 Scholars have called for invasive species management
plans to be formulated in every state to prevent spread of the grass,127
especially considering that “[t]he invasion of cogongrass into the
Southern United States has replaced the forest fire as the greatest
perceived threat to biodiversity, land use[] practices and land
values.”128
Cogongrass is spread through many vectors, including
contaminated forestry equipment used for site preparation, tree
planting and extraction, and other forest management activities.129
The impacts on private forestry can be profound. Controlled burn
activities are important to forest health, not only to prevent more
catastrophic fires, but also to maintain the overall health of the
forest. Cogongrass, however, burns so hot that not only does it
increase the risk of fire disasters for surrounding communities, but it
can actually kill trees present on burned sites.130 Scholars have noted
that “[c]ogongrass fires are very intense and hot, with little above
ground vegetation able to survive. . . . Fires from cogongrass are
typically 15 to 20% hotter and more intense than natural fires in
pine-based ecosystems in the Southern U.S.”131 In addition, once the
grass takes hold, species biodiversity in the ecosystem drops to
extremely low levels.132
These impacts on private forest management activities in the
South are potentially devastating. Eighty-six percent of southeastern
forests are privately owned,133 and “[u]nder the U.S. Constitution,
the federal government has limited authority and responsibility; all
other powers are reserved for the states. [Private] [f]orestland
management and use was one such reserved power.”134 While state
126. Id.
127. Id. at 8.
128. Lee Atkins, Operational Considerations for Control of Cogongrass, in COGONGRASS
CONFERENCE, supra note 124, at 38, 38.
129. David J. Moorhead & Charles T. Bargeron, Cogongrass Distribution and Spread
Prevention, in COGONGRASS CONFERENCE, supra note 124, at 24, 25.
130. See Gregory E. MacDonald, Cogongrass (Imperata cylindrical): Biology, Distribution
and Impacts in the Southeastern U.S., in COGONGRASS CONFERENCE, supra note 124, at 10,
12.
131. Id.
132. See Miller, supra note 124, at 7.
133. DAVID N. WEAR & JOHN G. GREIS, U.S. FOREST SERV., THE SOUTHERN FOREST
FUTURES
PROJECT:
SUMMARY
REPORT
58
(May
12,
2011),
http://
http://www.srs.fs.usda.gov/futures/reports/draft/summary_report.pdf.
134. Gerald A. Rose et al., Forest Resources Decision-Making in the US, in THE POLITICS
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and local governments maintain constitutional authority to regulate
private forest management, in the southeastern United States
especially, states maintain some of the most lax regulatory standards
in the world.135 Cogongrass’s threat to southern forestry is of critical
importance as the timber production sector in the South contributed
more than one million jobs and $51 billion in employee
compensation in 2009.136 Indeed, southern forests are the most
intensively managed forests in the United States,137 and a majority of
U.S. lumber is harvested from southern forests.138 Remarkably,
“since 1986, if the South were compared with any other country,
none would produce more timber than this one region of the United
States.”139 As a result of the perpetual spread of an invasive species
like cogongrass across the southeastern United States, having
profound interjurisdictional economic and environmental impact,
greater coordination provided by federal minimum standards may be
warranted to stave off a worsening disaster—even if such standards
intrude into traditional areas of state and local constitutional
regulatory authority.
C. Variables in the “Gray Area” of the Spectrum: Disaster Frequency
and Durational Impact
A variety of disasters exist in the gray area of the transitoryperpetual spectrum. These disasters do not neatly fall into one
category or the other because their frequency or durational impact or
both may cause them to take on the characteristics of both transitory
and perpetual disasters. Given their potential to take on the
characteristics of perpetual disasters, however, disasters in this area
may not only warrant greater federal inputs into land-use policy, but
if those inputs take the “top-down” form of federal minimum
standards, they may also be more constitutionally viable than they
would be for transitory disasters.

OF DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, POWER AND PEOPLE 238, 239 (Carol J. Pierce Colfer &
Doris Capistrano eds., 2005). See also JAN G. LAITOS ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 849
(2006).
135. MCDERMOTT ET AL., supra note 59.
136. WEAR & GREIS, supra note 133, at 17.
137. Id. at 29.
138. Id. at 5.
139. Id. at 17.
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1. Frequency—gulf hurricanes and Mississippi River Valley flooding
Some disasters may technically be transitory, in that there is a
temporal break between disaster events, but they can occur so
frequently as to mimic the continual and wide-scale effects of
perpetual disasters. Frequency can be so great over a period of time
that these disasters warrant greater national interest relative to the
localities in which destruction occurs. A couple of examples are
illustrative—Gulf hurricanes and flooding of the Mississippi River
Valley. In fact, the land-use planning issues implicated by these types
of disaster are quite related. Research has demonstrated that “[i]n
the United States, development in our Midwestern river valleys and
our Gulf Coast is removing the Gulf Coast wetlands at a rate of two
football fields every hour, bringing storms and the ocean ever
closer”140—a state of affairs which exacerbates the destruction caused
by both hurricanes and flooding.
Gulf hurricanes primarily implicate land-use planning by creating
other disasters, such as severe flood events. When residential and
commercial developments are located in flood-prone areas, hurricane
related costs, both economic and human, are greater. The recurrence
of hurricanes in the Gulf over decades, where every few years a state
of emergency is declared in one or more states, indicates that
transboundary and even nationwide harms are occurring on wide
scales. The aggregated state and local land-use planning related to
flood zones becomes of much greater national-level concern during
hurricane events. Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that low-lying
coastal lands, for instance, “are already vulnerable to erosion,
flooding, storm surges, and tsunamis; and poor development
planning has placed trillions of dollars worth of building and
infrastructure directly in the path of these threats.”141
It is not only land-use planning that places urban development in
floodplains, however, which exacerbates the damage caused by
hurricanes. The state of Louisiana is losing 6600 acres of coastal
wetlands per year—wetlands that are a natural hurricane disaster
mitigation resource.142 Though some of this loss is naturally

140. CHARLES PERROW, THE NEXT CATASTROPHE: REDUCING OUR VULNERABILITIES
(2007).
141. Tulou et al., supra note 76, at 578.
142. ROBERT VERCHICK, FACING CATASTROPHE: ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION FOR A
POST-KATRINA WORLD 19 (2010).

TO NATURAL, INDUSTRIAL, AND TERRORIST DISASTERS 39
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occurring, “the real culprits are human-made” and include not only
commercial and residential development of floodplains, but also
levees, navigational channels, and oil-and-gas infrastructure that have
“accelerate[d] coastal land loss by reducing the natural flow of the
[Mississippi] [R]iver’s freshwater and sediment to wetland areas,
where the lost land would then naturally be replenished.”143 Instead
of maintaining wetlands, that sediment travels down the Mississippi
and out into the Gulf as far as the outer continental shelf where it
cannot naturally form important barrier islands.144 These wetlands
could have prevented much of Katrina’s damage in New Orleans by
acting as a sponge for the storm surge. Other hurricane-prone states
face similarly staggering numbers of wetland loss. Over the last
fifteen years, Florida has lost 84,000 acres of wetlands to urban
development, or “subdivisions and strip malls”—a rate of 5600 acres
a year.145 Yet, even after the destruction wrought by Katrina, Florida
is the only Gulf Coast state to implement comprehensive planning
that requires local disaster mitigation plans.146
Despite the land-use-driven destruction of wetlands, both the
state and federal governments have failed to formulate a plan for
changing the status quo. After New Orleans experienced the near
miss of Hurricane Georges in 1998, a $14 billion wetlands
restoration plan was drawn up, but Congress and the Bush
administration balked at the proposal.147 After another near miss
from Hurricane Ivan and another balk on the project by Congress, a
member of the Louisiana governor’s office queried, “What is it going
to take for Congress and the president to realize this is not just
another project? Would we have had to get hit by the big one? Who
wants to wait for that? Surely it shouldn’t have to take loss of life,
does it?”148 The next year, Hurricane Katrina killed at least 1800
people and cost over $81 billion in damages.149 While wetlands
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Matthew Waite & Craig Pittman, Louisiana Wetlands Serve as Warning, Experts Say,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 6, 2005, at A10, available at http://www.sptimes.com/
2005/09/05/Worldandnation/Katrina_offers_lesson.shtml.
146. Berke & Campanella, supra note 49, at 201.
147. Waite & Pittman, supra note 145.
148. Id.
149. RICHARD D. KNABB ET AL., NOAA, TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE
KATRINA, 23–30 AUGUST 2005 at 11, 12 (last updated Sept. 14, 2011),
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL122005_Katrina.pdf.
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restoration and smarter development planning would not have
alleviated all of those deaths or economic costs, the $14 billion cost
of the wetlands restoration seems like a bargain compared to the $81
billion in damages wrought by Katrina.
Ultimately, hurricanes occur with such frequency, over such
broad scales, and with such significant national impact that even
though they are temporal, their recurrence justifies greater federal
inputs into mitigatory land-use planning. This is especially the case
considering that hurricanes are expected to become both more
frequent and more intense as climate change contributes to warmer
oceans.150
Flooding along vast watersheds like the Mississippi River Valley
also occurs with both frequency and large scale interjurisdictional
effects. The Mississippi River floods of 1993 were the result of a cold
winter followed by a wet spring, leaving nine states inundated—
North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa,
Missouri, Wisconsin, and Illinois.151 In total, fifty people died, $15
billion of damage occurred, a full seventy-five towns were
“completely under floodwaters,” and ten thousand homes were
destroyed.152
Rather than seek regulatory or other inputs into state and local
land-use planning in the region, the federal government spent $1
billion in a “voluntary buyout program designed to return
floodplains to their natural state, while some states did heighten
land-use standards restricting floodplain development.”153 As
discussed in Part II.A.1 above, however, Missouri was not one of
those states. Indeed, as of 2003, only nine states nationwide
maintained regulations prohibiting construction of certain “critical
facilities,” such as hospitals, water treatment plants, and emergency
centers, within floodplains.154
As scholars have noted, attacking the primary driver of
Mississippi watershed flooding is a particularly difficult task because
policymakers “are faced with a land-use planning system that is so

150. Tulou et al., supra note 76, at 578. More frequent and intense Category 4 and 5
storms have occurred over the past thirty years, a trend “directly linked to increases in seasurface temperatures.” Id.
151. PERROW, supra note 140, at 18.
152. Id.
153. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 34.
154. Id. at 36.

2020

DO NOT DELETE

1991

12/20/2011 2:51 PM

Reconstituting Land-Use Federalism

fragmented that concerted, coordinated actions between various
actors across all levels of government are severely hindered.”155
Regional watershed managers during the Missouri floods dealt with
“no fewer than 6 separate federal agencies, 23 state agencies spread
across 5 states, and over 233 municipalities.”156 The inability of
fragmented jurisdictions to coordinate mitigation efforts against a
single, highly devastating, but relatively frequent event like a
Mississippi Valley flood demonstrates a need for greater federal
inputs into land-use planning along watersheds in the valley.
2. Durational Impact—nuclear plant incident and the “Big One”
earthquake
Some disasters may only occur once, or far less frequently than
do “pure” transitory disasters, but the long-term, interjurisdictional,
nationwide durational impact is of a tremendous magnitude. A major
earthquake or a nuclear facility incident would be examples. These
disasters operate for a conceptually severed period of time just like
perpetual disasters, primarily due to the long-lasting, continual
nature of their after-effects.
The recent East Coast earthquake, with an epicenter in
Richmond, Virginia, could be felt along a stretch from Georgia to
Maine.157 The damage could have been far worse. Yet, perhaps
symbolic of both the infrequency of eastern earthquakes as well as
the fragility of national interests during times of disaster, the
Washington Monument was closed indefinitely until repairs could be
made to the structural damage caused by the quake.158
As Farber et al. note, in 2001 the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) identified the three most likely
catastrophes to hit the United States: a major earthquake along the
San Andreas fault, a terrorist attack on New York City, and a major
hurricane hitting New Orleans—the latter two have already
occurred, of course.159 Though predictions are difficult, the “big
155. Damien Leonard, Comment, Raising the Levee: Dutch Land Use Law as a Model for
U.S. Adaptation to Climate Change, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 543, 555 (2009).
156. Id.
157. Katharine Q. Seelye, Above All Else, Eastern Quake Rattles Nerves, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
24,
2011,
at
A1,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/24/us/
24quake.html?pagewanted=all.
158. Id.
159. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 39.
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one” is expected within decades160 and there is a “greater than 99
percent chance that a 6.7-magnitude earthquake will strike one of
California’s many major faults in the next thirty years.”161 A quake
the size of the 1906 San Francisco earthquake could kill between
800 and 3400 people, seriously injure between 4000 and 12,500
people, leave 400,000 to 600,000 people homeless, and result in
economic losses of between $93 billion and $120 billion.162 Landuse decisions made by the municipal government just after the 1906
San Francisco earthquake actually made potential destruction from a
future quake far more severe.163 To remedy this problem, the state of
California passed legislation in the 1970s to prevent the building of
residential structures along faults and to authorize local governments
to implement stricter zoning standards. Many local governments
have acted upon that authority.164
Charles Perrow argues that a primary reason for the city of Los
Angeles’ “vulnerability” to a major earthquake is the fact that the
Community Redevelopment Authority, appointed by the mayor, is
“largely composed of businessmen, and able to designate
development areas . . .” and includes members of the chemical
industry.165 As a result, the area maintains the second-highest
concentration of chemical facilities in the United States, many
located along earthquake faults.166 Perrow asserts,
Why they were built there in the first place and allowed to expand,
since the hazards were known and risky areas identified many
decades ago, is an important question. The answer appears to be
economic pressures on the political representatives responsible for
overseeing decisions about site selection, protection, and the
enforcement of regulations. Market forces are allowed to control
growth, but there seems to be a market failure for preventing or
mitigating low-probability/high-consequence accidents.167

Now certainly earthquakes may be localized in nature and more
appropriately categorized as transitory in some circumstances. Yet, as
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
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PERROW, supra note 140, at 33.
FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 39.
Id.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 40–41.
PERROW, supra note 140, at 34.
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with recurring hurricanes in the Gulf, the occurrence of a
catastrophic earthquake on the San Andreas Fault is only a matter of
time and the nationwide impacts would be profound. Perhaps under
such circumstances the federal government should have an increased
role in land-use planning in the region as a means of mitigating that
eventuality and also reducing its own inevitable expenditures
associated with disaster relief.
The recent East Coast earthquake actually highlighted one of the
threats posed by land-use planning associated with the siting of
nuclear power plants. Though the North Anna station accrued no
structural damage, just northwest of Richmond, Virginia, the reactor
was temporarily shut down.168 Twelve other plants “felt” the quake
but did not shut down.169 Concerns that a Fukushima-like disaster
could occur were immediately raised.170 The Fukushima nuclear plant
in Japan was crippled by this year’s devastating tsunami, itself
triggered by an earthquake, and the meltdown of reactors released
radiation, traces of which traveled all the way to the United States.171
The damage could take years to clean up.172
Earthquakes are not the only disaster that could give rise to a
nuclear disaster. Hurricanes also pose a threat to nuclear facilities.
Recently, Hurricane Irene slogged along a path that threatened more
than a dozen nuclear plants along the East Coast.173 None of them
lost power to their reactors, though two reactors were taken offline
because of the storm—a New Jersey nuclear plant for precautionary
reasons and a Maryland plant after debris generated by the hurricane

168. Rebecca Smith, Earthquake Triggers Reactor-Design Review, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27,
2011, at A3, available at http://tinyurl.com/897u7jx (subscription required).
169. Matthew L. Wald, 13 Plants Felt Earthquake, But Reactors Were Spared, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2011, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/26/
science/earth/26nuclear.html?_r=1&ref=earth.
170. Tom Hamburger & Melanie Mason, East Coast’s Quake Rekindles Debate on
Nuclear Plant Safety, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2011, at A20, available at
http://tinyurl.com/3awu9hu.
171. CNN Wire Staff, Japan’s Nuclear Contamination Spreads to More U.S. States, CNN
HEALTH (Mar. 29, 2011, 5:46 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/HEALTH/03/28/
radiation.us/index.html.
172. John M. Glionna, Japan Says Nuclear Plant Has Stabilized, L.A. TIMES, July 21,
2011, at A3, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-japanfukushima-20110721,0,730227.story.
173. Julie Johnsson, U.S. Nuclear Reactors Weather Irene Without Losing Power; One Goes
Offline, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 28, 2011, 4:23 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201108-28/u-s-nuclear-reactors-weather-hurricane-irene-safely-without-losing-power.html.
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damaged the plant and triggered an automatic shutdown.174 At the
Maryland plant, Irene hurled a piece of aluminum siding into the
primary transformer on the site.175
As these examples illustrate, the placement of a nuclear facility is
of critical importance in order to mitigate risk if a nuclear incident
occurs, especially in earthquake- and hurricane-prone zones. New
nuclear facilities are not sited with anything approaching regularity.
In addition, because the federal government generally maintains
preemptive regulatory control over nuclear energy in the United
States, the federal government already has a say in land-use planning
related to such facilities since the federal government may simply
refuse to permit a facility in the first instance.176 The federal
government, however, would be wise to wield this authority
responsibly in order to mitigate and prevent both the risk of and
ensuing damage from a nuclear incident.
D. Implications of the Transitory-Perpetual Disaster Spectrum
Categorization
The above categorizations are not meant to be exact or mutually
exclusive. Rather, the categories are merely meant to begin a more
holistic discussion of land-use-related disaster mitigation and
prevention, and to provide a framework within which to analyze
both which types of disaster require greater federal inputs as well as
how those inputs might best be achieved, including consideration of
the constitutionality of alternatives. Ultimately, land-use policies
related to perpetual and “gray area” disasters like sea-level rise,
nonpoint runoff, certain invasive species, Mississippi River Valley
flooding, Gulf hurricanes, nuclear incidents, and the “big one”
earthquake need greater federal inputs to forge effective disaster
mitigation and prevention. Even though bilateral and horizontal
mechanisms should certainly be utilized to supplement any topdown mechanism, some form of top-down regulatory inputs may be
needed due to the national interests at stake, the significant interjurisdictional effects, and the costs the federal government would
otherwise incur in post-disaster relief. As demonstrated in Figure 1, as

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Preemption Issues Under Atomic Energy Act of
1954, §§ 1 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2011 et seq., 198 A.L.R. FED. 147, at § 6[a] (2004).
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well as in the next Part, these top-down inputs might also be more
constitutionally viable than they would be for “pure” transitory
disasters like wildfires, localized flooding, and heat waves—disasters
for which they would also be less necessary. Those types of pure
transitory disasters are perhaps best addressed through bilateral or
horizontal means in order to avoid any constitutional federalism
complications.
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III. MECHANISMS OF RECONSTITUTING FEDERALISM WITHIN THE
BIMODAL FEDERALISM FRAMEWORK
Over the long term, the most straightforward and cost-effective strategy
to minimize or prevent damages and losses from natural hazards is to
guide development away from hazard-prone areas.177
It seems that state and local governments are doing little in the
way of guiding development out of disaster-prone areas, and indeed
are actively promoting that development. The federal government is
also incentivizing development of disaster-prone areas through
disaster relief, the tax code, housing and small business grants and
loans, insurance schemes, and a variety of other policies aimed at
promoting economic growth at the expense of long-term human,
economic, and environmental welfare. Thus, both national and
subnational governments must adjust policy decisions that exacerbate
the costs of disaster events.178 Aside from those policy choices,
however, what about the institutions that facilitate these decisions?
What about constitutional federalism? What if the federal
government needs to maintain greater inputs into subnational landuse planning related to disaster mitigation and prevention, and
garners the political will to do so, but is constitutionally constrained

177. Anna K. Schwab & David J. Brower, Increasing Resilience to Natural Hazards:
Obstacles and Opportunities for Local Governments Under the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000,
in LOSING GROUND: A NATION ON EDGE 287 (John R. Nolon & Daniel B. Rodriguez eds.,
2007) (citation omitted).
178. Indeed, political will is an “important obstacle” to local adoption of stricter landuse controls because
[f]ew local governments are willing to reduce natural hazards by managing
development. It is not so much that they oppose land-use measures (although some
do), but rather that, like individuals, they tend to view natural hazards as a minor
problem that can take a back seat to more pressing local concerns . . . . Also, the
costs of mitigation are immediate while the benefits are uncertain, do not occur
during the tenure of current elected officials, and are not visible . . . . In addition,
property rights lobbies are growing stronger. All of these factors contribute to a lack
of political leadership for limiting land use in hazardous areas.
DENNIS S. MILETI, DISASTERS BY DESIGN: A REASSESSMENT OF NATURAL HAZARDS IN THE
UNITED STATES 160 (1999). What Professor Mileti is describing is a tragedy of the commons
whereby state governments take on the characteristics of “rational herders” appropriating
depletable resources (the land base, the services provided by the natural capital replaced by
human-made capital, etc.), where in the absence of state or federal requirements it is
exceedingly difficult to exclude any one local government from appropriating such resources.
See Hudson, supra note 17.
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in those efforts?179 This Part deals with these questions—detailing
how the federal government may gain greater inputs into land-use
planning related to certain disasters and how those inputs might best
be achieved. To be clear, as detailed below, this is not to say that the
federal government will displace state and local authority to act.180
Rather, this section explores the best mechanisms for the federal
government to act as a “fail-safe”181 in the event that state and local
governments do not act. As Professor Buzbee described,
The historical division of authority among federal, state, and local
governments is not a historical accident, but has largely arisen as a
result of the relative institutional competence of each level of
government in addressing particular social needs. The optimal mix
of federal, state, and local regulatory roles, however, inevitably
changes over time as technological, environmental, market, and
political changes occur.182

This Part analyzes the best mechanisms to utilize for striking this
optimal mix from the perspective of both yielding results and
considering questions of constitutionality. Furthermore, these
mechanisms are discussed in the context of a new theory of
“Bimodal Federalism,” which acknowledges within the same
179. Some commentators have recently argued for a greater federal presence as a general
matter:
We need a more centralized regulatory system. Local initiative is simply not reliable
in the case of mitigation. Localities are reluctant to enforce state standards, national
standards are few, and enforcement is lax. This is an area where centralized
regulation—standards and enforcement—is needed; given the political influence of
growth-oriented city officials and property and building interests, there is bound to
be a “failure” of the private market.
PERROW, supra note 140, at 37.
180. Professor Buzbee has argued that
[t]he limited federal role in encouraging or prohibiting particular urban forms or
types of land use is the result of historical traditions and constitutionally limited
grants of authority to the federal government. Virtually all scholarly examinations of
sprawl and suburbanization trends point out, however, that federal laws and
regulations have already influenced metropolitan growth patterns. Thus, an
increased federal role seeking to address or to deter sprawl or its ills would
constitute a change in federal policy, but would not constitute a wholly new entry
into fields of law and regulation influencing urban form. Recent decisions by the
United States Supreme Court make less likely any substantial expansion of federal
authority to displace state and local land-use decisionmaking.
Buzbee, supra note 96, at 98.
181. See Blake Hudson, Fail-Safe Federalism and Climate Change: The Case of U.S. and
Canadian Forest Policy, 44 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
182. Buzbee, supra note 96, at 94.
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framework the seemingly irreconcilable conceptions of federalism as
defined by dynamic and dualistic theories of federalism.
A. The Bimodal Federalism Framework: Integrating Dynamic
Federalism with Remnants of Dual Federalism
A significant tension exists in scholarly debates over the
constitutional workings of U.S. federalism, particularly in the
environmental and land-use context. As explained below, this
tension centers around normative, interpretive, and descriptive
analyses of two different modes of federalism in operation in the
United States today—“dynamic federalism” and “dual federalism”—
as well as an apparent presumption that either one or the other is the
correct theoretical descriptor of U.S. federalism. Theories of dual
federalism posit that “the states and the federal government inhabit[]
mutually exclusive spheres of power,”183 while dynamic federalism
“rejects any conception of federalism that separates federal and state
authority under the dualist notion that the states need a sphere of
authority protected from the influence of the federal government”
and posits that “federal and state governments function as alternative
centers of power and any matter is presumptively within the
authority of both the federal and the state governments.”184 Both
dynamic and dual federalism involve normative, interpretive, and
descriptive claims about not only the proper operation of U.S.
federalism, but also about how U.S. federalism operates in fact.
Yet, neither of these theories in isolation provides an accurate
descriptive picture of the actual operation of U.S. federalism today.
Based upon these definitions, it is true that dynamic federalism may
be a more accurate interpretation of how many, if not most, federalstate regulatory interactions occur—especially in the modern
regulatory state. We may even be witnessing a transition from dual
operations of federalism to dynamic ones regarding a wide array of
subject matters. In the environmental and land-use context, dynamic
federalism may also be the more appropriate normative theory of
federalism to achieve successful legal and policy results on the
ground. Yet, regarding certain regulatory subjects, remnants of dual
federalism remain, and these remnants also form an integral part of

183. Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental
Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 175 (2006).
184. Id. at 176 (emphasis added).
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the current scope of U.S. constitutional federalism.185 An example is
direct land-use regulation, where strong notions that “states need a
sphere of authority protected from the influence of the federal
government” do in fact remain, regardless of normative claims that
states do not need a separate sphere.186 These remnants of dual
federalism should not be ignored in analysis and application of
modern federalism theory or in proposed solutions to federalism
conflicts. The following discussion demonstrates how the full scope
of U.S. federalism theory may be thought of as increasingly
integrating principles of dynamic federalism in combination with asof-yet unresolved principles of dual federalism. This integrated view
of federalism is a theory of “Bimodal Federalism” that seeks to
recognize federalism as it in fact operates in the context of present
day constitutional scholarly debates and jurisprudence. The word
“bimodal” simply means “having or providing two modes, methods,
[or] systems.”187 Thus, bimodal federalism analysis takes federalism
at face value today and includes application of federalism principles
that might fall under either the dynamic or the dual mode of
federalism.
Dynamic federalism theory questions the previously held
federalism assumptions that “regulatory authority to address
environmental ills should be allocated to one or the other level of
government with minimal overlap.”188 Professor Engel has argued
that
a static allocation of authority between the state and federal
government is inconsistent with the process of policymaking in our
federal system, in which multiple levels of government interact in
the regulatory process. Absent constitutional changes that would
185. As Professor Schapiro has noted, “the basic conception of federalism continues to be
a system of independent national and state governments that must be protected from each
other,” and “[d]ualist conceptions survive” in some areas. Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a
Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 246 (2005). Even so, this Article does
not seek to make normative claims about how dynamic U.S. federalism should be from a
constitutional perspective or to argue that there are or are not separate dualist spheres of
governance. Rather, the Article simply recognizes that the debate is being waged and as a
result legislative and policy responses should be sensitive to the current constitutional reality—a
reality that jurisprudentially may very well result in continued judicial carve-outs of separate
spheres of governance for the federal or state governments.
186. Engel, supra note 183, at 176.
187. Bimodal
Definition,
DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/
browse/bimodal (last visited Oct. 14, 2011).
188. Engel, supra note 183, at 161.
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lock in a specific allocation of authority, broad, overlapping
authority between levels of government may be essential to
prompting regulatory activity at the preferred level of
government.189

Dynamic federalism recognizes the importance of non-static
allocations of regulatory authority in federal systems and “conceives
the states and the federal government as alternative—not mutually
exclusive—sources of regulatory authority.”190 The practical
application of dynamic federalism is in crafting federal legislative
solutions that allow subnational governments flexibility to regulate
within a “standards framework” provided by the federal government,
such that, for example, “where national uniformity is desired,
Congress might allow for the development of a single standard by
the states themselves, as opposed to the imposition of a standard by
the federal government.”191 In other words, the federal government
might set a target, limit, or other regulatory goal and allow
subnational governments the ability to take into account local
considerations when designing mechanisms to achieve that target or
limit. That is, after all, one of the primary justifications for a
decentralized form of federal governance.192 Furthermore,
interaction between levels of government “can lead either, or both,
parties to adopt policy positions significantly different from the
positions they would have adopted had they been regulating in a
vacuum,”193 and “has important benefits in terms of developing
quality, responsive regulation, and spreading regulatory
innovations.”194
189. Id.
190. Id. at 162.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 175.
193. Id. at 171.
194. Id. at 173. Other scholars, such as Professor Osofsky, have promoted “diagonal
federalism” strategies that “incorporate key public and private actors at different levels of
government (the vertical piece) and within each level of government (the horizontal piece)
simultaneously in order to create needed crosscutting interactions.” Hari M. Osofsky,
Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change: Implications for the Obama Administration, 62
ALA. L. REV. 237, 241 (2011). In the disaster and land-use context “[t]here is evidence of a
shift in governmental policy towards the vertical integration of federal, state, and local
governmental action in order to most effectively and comprehensively address land
development in disaster prone areas as well as a host of other economic development and
environmental problems.” John R. Nolon, Disaster Mitigation Through Land Use Strategies, 23
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 959, 964 (2006).
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Discussions of multiscalar, dynamic solutions to federalism
problems is certainly important, and the depth of analysis it provides
helps curb oversimplification of both the need for and efficacy of
different types of solutions to federalism-driven environmental
concerns at different levels of government. To be clear, this Article
fully supports, as a normative matter, jurisdictional overlap to the
extent that it is viable under current constitutional jurisprudence.
There is a danger, however, in allowing a focus on the very real
benefits of dynamic federalism to detract from recognition of the
current constitutional federalism reality. Despite the clear
attractiveness of dynamic federalism in achieving better on-theground environmental and land-use law and policy responses—the
normative claim for how federalism often does and perhaps should
operate—the fact remains that while it may not be preferable from an
environmental or land-use perspective, dualism still informs
constitutional federalism jurisprudence in some areas—this, of
course, is the descriptive constitutional reality.195 This disconnect
between normative and descriptive federalism analysis is evidenced by
the debate over the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.196
Recognizing that “dynamic federalism” exists and is beneficial, and
that the federal and state governments should both set regulatory
limits on any subject matter, does not make it a current
constitutional reality, especially in light of continued judicial and
scholarly tussling over the existence of exclusive spheres of
governance at various levels of government.
The interstate, commercial impacts of a variety of—if not most—
environmental and land-use-related issues are very real, and debate
over the constitutional validity of federal legislation aimed at
addressing those issues via the Commerce Clause should continue.197
Yet, despite the fact that dual federalism has never accurately
reflected the historical U.S. federalism status quo, in that the federal
government regulates some activities that are purely local while state
and local governments address issues of national and even global
concern,198 neither does dynamic federalism alone accurately reflect

195. Engel, supra note 183, at 175.
196. Id.
197. See generally Blake Hudson, Commerce in the Commons: A Unified Theory of
Natural Capital Regulation Under the Commerce Clause, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 375
(2011).
198. Engel, supra note 183, at 167–68. Indeed, most dynamic federalism literature does
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the current U.S. federalism status quo. There remain areas in which
dual federalism informs both political and legal decisions for
addressing problems long considered the sovereign realm of state
and local authority. Some evidence of this can be seen in the
continued debates over the scope of the Commerce Clause,199 and in
not debate the Constitution at all but rather recognizes that for the most part there is
concurrent authority between federal and state governments. As a result, most of the scholarly
conversation is not a question of what is constitutional but what form or structure of
governance is best. See, e.g., DILEMMAS OF SCALE IN AMERICA’S FEDERAL DEMOCRACY
(Martha Derthick ed., 1999); BARRY G. RABE, STATEHOUSE AND GREENHOUSE: THE
EMERGING POLITICS OF AMERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 1–37 (2004); David E.
Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Reorienting State Climate Change Policies to Induce
Technological Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 835 (2008); Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical
Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863 (2006); Robert B. Ahdieh, Foreign Affairs, International
Law, and the New Federalism: Lessons from Coordination, 73 MO. L. REV. 1185 (2008);
Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemic Governance: The Changing Nature of
Modern Jurisdiction, 57 EMORY L.J. 1 (2007); Robert B. Ahdieh, When Subnational Meets
International: The Politics and Place of Cities, States, and Provinces in the World, 102 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 339 (2008); Joseph W. Dellapenna, Law in a Shrinking World: The
Interaction of Science and Technology with International Law, 88 KY. L.J. 809 (2000); Kirsten
Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating State and Local
Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About Federalism and
Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015 (2006); David R. Hodas, State Law Responses to
Global Warming: Is It Constitutional to Think Globally and Act Locally?, 21 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 53 (2003); Alice Kaswan, Climate Change, Consumption, and Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 253 (2009); Alice Kaswan, The Domestic Response to Global Climate Change: What Role for
Federal, State, and Litigation Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 39 (2007); Barry G. Rabe, North
American Federalism and Climate Change Policy: American State and Canadian Provincial
Policy Development, 14 WIDENER L.J. 121, 128–51 (2004); Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration:
American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE
L.J. 1564 (2006); Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global Climate Regulation:
Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 681 (2008); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Jack
Barkenbus & Jonathan Gilligan, Individual Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55
UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2008); Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of Global
Environmental Law, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 615 (2009).
199. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Limiting Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
743 (2005); Eric R. Claeys, Raich and Judicial Conservatism at the Close of the Rehnquist
Court, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 791 (2005); Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce
by Another Name: The Impact of United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 68
TENN. L. REV. 605 (2001); Dan Gildor, Preserving the Priceless: A Constitutional Amendment
to Empower Congress to Preserve, Protect, and Promote the Environment, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 821
(2005); Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1,
38 (2003); Bradford C. Mank, Protecting Intrastate Threatened Species: Does the Endangered
Species Act Encroach on Traditional State Authority and Exceed the Outer Limits of the
Commerce Clause?, 36 GA. L. REV. 723, 735–36 (2002); Bradford C. Mank, The Murky
Future of the Clean Water Act After SWANCC: Using a Hydrological Connection Approach to
Saving the Clean Water Act, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 811, 844–46 (2003); Thomas W. Merrill,
Rescuing Federalism After Raich: The Case for Clear Statement Rules, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 823, 844 (2005); John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands
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continued discussions in both scholarly literature and judicial
decisions giving credence to the exclusive regulatory role of state and
local governments over land use.200 Other evidence, however, is
largely evidence by omission, in that the federal government has
never attempted to assert direct regulatory inputs into subnational
policies related to, for example, local zoning schemes, nonpoint
source pollution, or private forest management—presumably because
the federal government has viewed its hands as constitutionally tied.
In fact, the failure of Congress to pass the National Land Use
Policy Act (discussed below) during the most active time of federal
environmental regulatory expansion in history, and the voluntary,
bilateral nature of the primary federal statute aimed at influencing
direct land-use planning, the Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA), indicates that dual federalist notions remain in the area of
land-use planning.201 If urban sprawl is such a well-recognized
problem of national import, driven largely by state and local
governments competing for economic growth and development with
negative aggregate effects on the environment, why has the federal
government not passed a statute to, for example, “establish limit
lines and urban growth boundaries for any city in the U.S. over X
population?” It could certainly attempt to do so while maintaining
the benefits of dynamic federalism, in that local governments could
maintain flexibility in designing their own land-use policies within
that framework. Yet, the federal government has not yet attempted
to claim such authority, almost certainly due to notions of dual
federalism. The same might be said regarding land-use planning
related to disaster mitigation and prevention. For example, as

Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174 (1998); Sarah D. Van Loh, The Latest and Greatest
Commerce Clause Challenges to the Endangered Species Act: Rancho Viejo and GDF Realty, 31
ECOLOGY L.Q. 459 (2004); Lori J. Warner, The Potential Impact of United States v. Lopez on
Environmental Regulation, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 321 (1997); Omar N. White, The
Endangered Species Act’s Precarious Perch: A Constitutional Analysis Under the Commerce
Clause and the Treaty Power, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 215, 235 (2000); Ernest A. Young, Just
Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist Revival After Gonzales v. Raich, 2005
SUP. CT. REV. 1 (2005); Eric Brignac, Comment, The Commerce Clause Justification of Federal
Endangered Species Protection: Gibbs v. Babbitt, 79 N.C. L. REV. 873, 883 (2001).
200. See supra note 16.
201. Indeed, though the CZMA “recognized a national interest in effective coastal
management, Congress also recognized that the type of land-use planning and management
required was traditionally within the domain of state and local governments.” Kristen M.
Fletcher, Managing Coastal Development, in OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND POLICY 147,
152 (Donald C. Baur et al. eds., 2008).
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discussed above in the context of nonpoint source water pollution
from agricultural runoff, Professor Craig acknowledges that
Congress’s
operation
“within
constitutional
federalism
requirements” has arguably caused it to misjudge the
constitutionality of seeking direct regulatory inputs at the federal
level into nonpoint pollution assumed to be the sole regulatory
purview of the state and local governments.202 Just the very fact that
scholars and Congress continue to ruminate over whether such
regulation would be constitutional under the Commerce Clause or
are properly exclusive spheres of state and local governance,203
especially given increasing evidence of the interstate commercial
impacts of aggregated land-use policies, demonstrates that notions of
dual federalism remain with us and affect land-use law and policy in a
very real way.
Until the federal government seeks direct land-use inputs via
legislative means and such legislation is either constitutionally
validated or denied by the courts, it is hard to discount notions of
dualism or to assume that courts will not continue to engage in
judicial protections of federalism by wrangling over constitutional
provisions like the Commerce Clause. Regardless of whether
constitutional federalism should be judicially or politically
protected,204 or whether courts do or do not have the “ability to
police the contours of federalism” under doctrines like the
Commerce Clause,205 judicial protections remain in place and courts
continue to be in “the business of distinguishing between regulatory

202. Craig, supra note 101, at 179–81. Craig notes that “[c]omprehensive federal
regulation of nonpoint source pollution would thus arguably engage the federal government in
land use regulation—a type of regulation historically viewed as belonging almost exclusively to
more local levels of government” and that “because of federalism restrictions, Congress cannot
and has not forced states to assume any regulatory burden with respect to nonpoint sources of
water pollution. Therefore, regulation of nonpoint source polluters is left largely to states’
individual regulatory discretion.” Id. at 182, 186.
203. Craig argues that
[a]s a matter of constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause, therefore, the
federal government has plenary power to regulate nonpoint source pollution that
enters waters that are navigable in fact, which traditionally includes all waters subject
to the ebb and flow of the tide. In addition, the federal government can, under
Lopez, regulate nonpoint source pollution that, in the aggregate, substantially affects
interstate commerce.
Id. at 212 (footnote omitted).
204. Schapiro, supra note 185, at 278–80.
205. Engel, supra note 183, at 174.
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matters that are left to the states and those that fall within Congress’s
jurisdictional reach.”206 These judicial protections establish a
precedent that points toward a future of continued wrangling over
the constitutionality of federal versus subnational regulatory
authority over certain subject matter.207 These remnants of “dual
federalism” remain with us,208 and despite normative claims that dual
federalism should go quietly into the night,209 it is unclear that it will
disappear from constitutional, environmental, and, especially, landuse-related jurisprudence any time soon.
If we accept that dual federalism still influences environmental
and land-use policy, we can also better understand the operation and
full potential of dynamic federalism principles. For example, if the
federal government does not currently maintain any recognized
constitutional authority over certain forms of subnational land-use
planning, then subnational governments may completely disregard
or ignore federal targets, limits, or other goals. As a result, there will
be no opportunity for “overlapping authority between levels of
government,”210 and local, state, and federal roles will remain
constitutionally mutually exclusive, thus undermining the very
principles of dynamic federalism.
The goal of this Part and related research211 is to introduce and
develop a framework theory of bimodal federalism whereby scholars
assess the current status of the constitutional institutions that
facilitate the federal form of governance, including notions of
dynamic federalism and remnant notions of dual federalism that

206. Id. at 183. It may be true that “such line drawing forces the Court into making
superficial distinctions of little relevance to the issue of whether federal regulation is truly
appropriate.” Id. at 184. Whether the federal government should be able to regulate certain
subject matters, however, is a distinct question from current judicial interpretations of
constitutional structure.
207. Id. at 174.
208. Id. at 175.
209. Id.; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different
Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313 (2004); Erwin Chemerinsky, Federalism Not
as Limits, But as Empowerment, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1219 (1997); Renee M. Jones, Dynamic
Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107
(2005); Schapiro, supra note 185.
210. Engel, supra note 183, at 161.
211. The author has written a series of recent articles related to this model of federalism.
See Hudson, supra notes 17, 181, 197 and infra note 246. See also Blake Hudson, Federal
Constitutions, Global Governance, and the Role of Forests in Regulating Climate Change, 87
IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2012).
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manifest legally and politically, notwithstanding normative claims
that those manifestations should not occur. The insights derived
from bimodal federalism analysis allow us to consider the relative
viability and appropriateness of legislative responses based upon any
currently recognized institutional constraints at any level of
governance. Bimodal federalism theory should encapsulate a
snapshot of U.S. federalism at a point in time, taking into account
current practical applications of past federalism theory (dual
federalism)212 and assessing them within the same framework as
current applications of new theories of federalism (dynamic
federalism).213 Doing so provides not only a clearer conception of the
current state of constitutional affairs regarding federal, state, or local
regulatory authority over certain subject matter, but also the most
effective methods of overcoming potential federalism-driven
regulatory roadblocks.
This Article accepts the normative claim that there should be as
much overlap as possible in jurisdictional regulatory authority to
capture the benefits of dynamic federalism, and to the extent one
level of government is not tackling an important issue, other levels of
government should be able to fill the void. Thus, federal, state, and
local governments should share regulatory responsibilities, and none
should be arbitrarily precluded or preempted from addressing any
regulatory target.214 Arbitrary preclusion, however, is different from
preclusion based upon the reality of current constitutional
jurisprudence. As such, bimodal federalism acknowledges that there
may be judicially and politically driven dualistic notions regarding
certain regulatory targets that must be taken into account when
crafting regulatory responses, notwithstanding increased recognition
of, and normative claims for, a movement towards governance via
dynamic federalism. To the extent that remnant dualist notions
remain and restrain the operation of dynamic federalism, this Article
seeks to develop an understanding of what types of legislative
mechanisms most readily provide viable policy responses, including
an assessment of the constitutional viability of those responses. In
other words, what legislative mechanisms across levels of governance
212. Engel, supra note 183, at 175.
213. See generally id.
214. As Professor Engel has noted, there is “danger [in] charging any one level of
government with environmental protection and closing the door to the policy-making efforts
of other levels of government.” Id. at 181.
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are not only normatively desirable, given dynamic federalism, but are
also constitutionally permissible in areas where dualistic notions
remain, such as the area of land-use planning? This constitutional
analysis serves as a reference point for legislators seeking to
implement effective solutions without constitutional complication
and for courts adjudicating conflicts over allocation of regulatory
authority.
To this end, it becomes necessary to independently assess the
well-recognized concepts215 of “top-down,” “bilateral,” and
“horizontal” legislative responses to addressing federalism issues. It is
necessary to utilize these concepts because in an area where dualist
remnants remain, such as exclusive subnational regulatory authority
over general land-use planning, there may currently be no
constitutionally viable top-down federal approach available. As a
result, bilateral and horizontal approaches are the only mechanisms
that may overlap in a dynamic way. Thus, given the reality of the
dynamic/dualist nature of U.S. federalism, it is important to
consider the actual legislative mechanisms facilitating regulatory
solutions across levels of government. This is especially so
considering that dynamic federalism principles may be stifled in the
presence of constitutional roadblocks at any one level of governance.
The usage of these terms, however, is not intended to refer back
to strict dual-federalism theory, which analyzed these mechanisms as
mutually exclusive means of facilitating governance in federal
systems. Rather, consistent with dynamic-federalism theory, these
mechanisms may be operating simultaneously at all levels of
governance.216 Indeed, as dynamic federalism scholars have

215. See Osofsky, supra note 194, at 276, 278–80; see also Craig Anthony Arnold, The
Structure of the Land Use Regulatory System in the United States, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
441 (2007); William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 108 (2005); William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of
Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 49–56 (2003); Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and
Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2009); Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93
MINN. L. REV. 493 (2008); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH.
L. REV. 570 (1996); Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water
Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405 (2006).
216. Indeed, the extensive scholarly literature cited in supra notes 198 and 215 is often
grouped under the heading of dynamic federalism and explores these different types of
relationships. This Article lays out the three fundamental modalities most often discussed, each
of which could be pieces of a dynamic approach, but which also must take into account
remnants of dual federalism currently being debated in both the scholarly literature and the
judiciary.
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highlighted, “overlapping jurisdiction may be pivotal to encouraging
the more appropriate level of government to respond to a given
problem.”217 As a result, the analysis below is not intended to neatly
affix one particular mechanism as the only appropriate solution to
one particular category of disaster. The “coupling” in the analysis
below seeks to associate one particular mechanism with one or more
categories of disaster only for the purposes of, first, assessing the
potential constitutionality of federal top-down mechanisms for
different categories of disaster, and, second, making a normative
claim that some disasters may call for more significant federal inputs
into subnational land-use policy which some mechanisms might
more readily facilitate than others. Thus, it is the balance of federal
and subnational inputs with which this Article is concerned—a
balance that may call for greater federal inputs in circumstances
where subnational governments fail to act. For example, in the
absence of subnational action to adjust land-use policies related to
perpetual disasters, the scale of such disasters and the national
interest that they implicate may call for the more consistent and
holistic standards facilitated by a top-down approach. At the same
time, bilateral and horizontal mechanisms may certainly overlap,
supplement, or even exceed any minimum top-down standards that
exist, consistent with dynamic federalism. Indeed, this Part echoes
disaster scholar Charles Perrow’s call for “[f]ederal and state
governments [to] establish minimum standards, which states or
localities can exceed”218—in other words, to establish floors rather
than ceilings of environmental and land-use standards.219 Or perhaps
the federal government could establish mandatory guidelines for
setting standards, but allow states and localities the flexibility to
tailor such standards in a way that not only facilitates the benefits of
decentralized governance but that also achieves effective land-userelated disaster mitigation and prevention goals for all categories of
disaster.
B. Top-Down
The first mechanism for reconstituting land-use federalism in the
context of disaster mitigation and prevention is a top-down approach
217. Engel, supra note 183, at 177.
218. PERROW, supra note 140, at 36.
219. Engel, supra note 183, at 185.
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whereby the U.S. federal government attempts to use currently
available constitutional mechanisms to gain legal inputs into
subnational land-use policy. This would require either a direct
amendment to the U.S. Constitution granting the federal
government constitutional authority or it would necessitate
expanded judicial interpretation of current constitutional provisions
that might grant the federal government such authority.
1. Constitutional amendment
Various scholars have discussed both the need for and the
efficacy of amending the U.S. Constitution either to provide citizens
a fundamental constitutional right to environmental protection or to
allow the federal government to constitutionally regulate the
environment via mechanisms that it may not currently employ.220
Though a constitutional amendment allowing greater federal inputs
into land-use policies aimed at avoiding or mitigating environmental
disaster is certainly a possibility, this mechanism for reconstituting
federalism is perhaps the least likely to occur.
There have been over ten thousand proposed amendments to the
U.S. Constitution,221 and of course only a few have passed—no
doubt due to the difficulties of pushing an amendment through the
Article V process.222 Professor J.B. Ruhl has provided a framework
for assessing the efficacy and desirability of amending the U.S.
Constitution with an “environmental quality amendment” (EQA),
noting that calls for such an amendment have been on the rise in

220. See Robin Kundis Craig, Should There Be a Constitutional Right to a Clean/Healthy
Environment?, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 11013 (2004); Gildor, supra note 199; J.B. Ruhl, The
Metrics of Constitutional Amendments: And Why Proposed Environmental Quality Amendments
Don’t Measure Up, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245 (1999); Rodger Schlickeisen, Protecting
Biodiversity for Future Generations: An Argument for a Constitutional Amendment, 8 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 181 (1994); Pamela B. Schmaltz, Comment, Is It Time for an Environmental
Amendment?, 38 LOY. L. REV. 451, 461–62 (1992).
221. RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN & JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LOVE THE
CONSTITUTION SO MUCH, WHY DO WE KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE IT? 169 (1993). See also
JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING ISSUES, 1789–2002 at 540–58 (2003) (collating most
popular proposals by year); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, On Amending the Constitution: A Plea for
Patience, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 677, 681–93 (1989–90) (discussing the successful
passage of various amendments).
222. A constitutional amendment must be proposed by either two-thirds of both houses
or two-thirds of state governments and ratified by three-quarters of state governments. U.S.
CONST. art. V.
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recent decades.223 EQAs tend to be very general and aspirational, as
Ruhl describes, including language such as, “[t]he natural resources
of the nation are the heritage of present and future generations. The
right of each person to clean and healthful air and water, and to the
protection of other natural resources of the nation, shall not be
infringed by any person.”224
Ruhl developed a matrix to assess the viability of proposed
amendments along two axes: a function axis and a target axis.225
The function axis describes the institutional role that the amendment
is to serve, such as whether it (1) alters the operational rules of
government, (2) prohibits specified government action, (3) creates
or affirms individual rights, or (4) expresses aspirational goals.226 The
target axis describes the societal interaction that is adjusted by the
functional change, such as (1) intra- and intergovernmental relations,
(2) relations between a government and its citizens, or (3) relations
between citizens.227 Ruhl notes that EQAs tend to fall into a
category that no existing amendment to the Constitution does—that
of an amendment establishing aspirational goals (function 4) for
citizen-citizen relations (target 3). Ruhl believes the Constitution is
no place for these types of aspirational dictates,228 largely because
such a mandate must necessarily be drafted either ambiguously or so
narrowly as to make implementation exceedingly difficult.
An amendment that would allow U.S. federal government inputs
into land-use decisions related to disaster mitigation and prevention,
however, would fall into a category far more likely to be efficacious
according to Ruhl’s matrix—if, that is, such an amendment could
first be passed. Such an amendment might simply declare: “The
federal government of the United States maintains the authority to
establish regulatory standards for land-use-related disaster mitigation
and prevention.” This amendment would have the function of
altering the operational rules of government (function 1) in order to

223. Ruhl, supra note 220, at 247, 248–49.
224. Id. at 248.
225. Id. at 253.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Ruhl states that “any EQA attempting to capture a normative statement about the
environment and plug it into the United States Constitution is simply a bad idea,” id. at 252,
and that “amendments purporting to express aspirational values or regulate civil relations, or
do both, should set off bells and whistles in the political evaluation process.” Id. at 260.
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adjust the target of intergovernmental relations (target 1).229 Indeed,
nine amendments currently fall under this category of the matrix.230
If U.S. federal and subnational governments one day agreed to
change the operational rules of government and the current status of
intergovernmental relations by allowing more direct federal inputs
into land-use planning via a constitutional amendment, the
amendment would fall into the category described by Ruhl as far
more likely to be viable in achieving results than aspirational, citizencitizen relation amendments. Furthermore, though the legislative
process is preferable to constitutional amendment a vast majority of
the time, lest the constitution become diluted and take the form of a
legislative instrument, society may be unable to achieve some policies
in the absence of an amendment.231 Ruhl argues that
[t]he question of need, therefore, is whether there is any
institutional barrier to fulfilling the fundamental, widely accepted
social policy through routine legislative and judicial forums. . . .
[S]ome amendments have forced an intransigent minority of states
to come into line with the rest of the nation on fundamental social
policy issues associated with matters traditionally (or
constitutionally) left to state jurisdiction. Where federal legislation
cannot impose the policy over state resistance and the courts
cannot mold the existing constitutional text to handle the stubborn
states, an amendment is the only alternative. These are examples of
institutional necessity, where an amendment, and only an
amendment, can allow the widely accepted social policy to move
forward in society.232

There is arguably an institutional barrier to certain federal regulatory
inputs into local land-use policies—a barrier in the form of current
understandings of U.S. constitutional law. Furthermore, the dearth
of responsible state and local government land-use planning related
to disaster mitigation and prevention demonstrates that an
amendment allowing greater federal inputs into subnational land-use

229. It would not be prohibitory (target 2) because it would allow the states to also set
land-use standards related to disaster prevention and mitigation, consistent with principles of
dynamic federalism. It also would not create or affirm any rights in either private parties or
governmental entities (target 3), and it is clearly not aspirational (target 4), as is an EQA.
230. Ruhl, supra note 220, at 261.
231. Id. at 270–71.
232. Id. at 271 (footnotes omitted).
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policy could be a last resort to overcoming that barrier with the most
effective social policy.
Other scholars have similarly argued for constitutional
amendments to rebalance the relationship between the U.S. federal
government and the states, which would allow greater federal inputs
into environmental policy making when the states refuse to act.233
This type of amendment would be a “purely structural
amendment,”234 rather than a substantive amendment providing a
right to a clean and healthy environment, and it would merely
“empower[] Congress to legislate regarding the environment”235 if
Congress chose to do so. In other words, nothing would compel the
federal government to act, nor would any new fundamental
constitutional rights be created in the citizenry.
The likelihood of an amendment being efficacious, however, is a
different question from whether such an amendment is likely to be
passed. The U.S. Congress has never attempted to harness current
constitutional powers to directly address subnational land-use policy,
much less placed a constitutional amendment on its agenda. So even
though this type of structural amendment may be of the kind most
likely to be workable if enacted, and remains an option worthy of
future study, it remains perhaps the least viable mechanism for
reconstituting federalism to address transitory and perpetual
disasters—especially given the difficulty of convincing three-quarters
of the states to ratify an amendment that intrudes on state regulatory
powers, and given that any kind of “constitutional environmental
amendment is unlikely in the current political climate.”236 An
amendment, however, is not the only top-down mechanism available
to the United States, as current constitutional provisions may
provide the federal government authority over subnational disasterrelated land-use policy that it has not yet claimed or that has not yet
been validated by courts interpreting the Constitution.
2. Constitutional interpretation
A more viable mechanism for top-down reconstitution of
federalism for certain types of disaster mitigation and prevention is

233.
234.
235.
236.

Craig, supra note 220, at 11018–20.
Id. at 11020.
Gildor, supra note 199, at 823.
Craig, supra note 220, at 11018.
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expanded understanding of current constitutional provisions. In the
United States, the Commerce Clause is the primary constitutional
provision under which most environmental legislation is passed.237
Congress could certainly pass a “Land Use Disaster Mitigation and
Prevention Act” that would test the waters of judicial interpretation
regarding the scope of Congress’s authority under the Commerce
Clause. Of course, the purpose of the transitory/perpetual spectrum
is to demonstrate for which types of disasters it might be more
constitutionally viable for the federal government to gain direct
regulatory inputs. Therefore, if such a statute sought to limit or set
other land-use policies and rules for the development of floodplains
in the Mississippi River Valley, due to the frequent and
interjurisdictional (interstate) economic damages resulting from
major flood events, then under Commerce Clause jurisprudence
such an act might be more likely to be found constitutional. The
same holds true for potential federal regulation of nonpoint source
agricultural pollution that empties from the Mississippi River Valley
and leads to eutrophication of the Gulf, negatively impacting
fisheries, and for land-use policies that exacerbate the spread of
invasive species that have devastating economic impacts across state
jurisdictions—like the cogongrass that plagues the forest industry.
These types of disasters, though related to private land-use
regulation that has historically been the constitutional purview of
state and local governments, may very well be reached under the
“substantial effects” test for determining the constitutionality of
federal action under the Commerce Clause.238 Numerous federal
statutes regulating natural resources have been upheld under this
test,239 including the Endangered Species Act, which was upheld
even for the regulation of wholly intrastate species with arguably

237. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
238. Congress can regulate three kinds of activities under the Commerce Clause: (1) the
channels of interstate commerce, (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and (3)
“those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, . . . i.e., those activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59
(1995) (citations omitted).
239. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (marijuana); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter
of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (endangered species); United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (wetlands); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S.
314 (1981) (minerals); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981) (minerals); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (endangered species);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (wheat).
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tenuous connections to interstate commerce.240 How much more so,
then, might land-use policies that implicate agricultural, commercial,
and industrial impacts on navigable waterways (floodplains and water
bodies affected by nonpoint runoff); that implicate commercial and
other development in the coastal zone (impacted by hurricanes,
floods, and sea-level rise); and that exacerbate interjurisdictional
impacts and federal disaster relief expenditures, be found to
substantially affect interstate commerce? Unlike endangered species,
after all, agricultural and fisheries products are commodities that are
exchanged on the open market. The development of floodplains and
the coastal zone also implicates commercial activity with direct ties to
a resource over which the federal government has already been found
to have constitutional authority—“navigable waters” as that term is
interpreted under the Clean Water Act.
Recent research establishes a unified theory for assessing the
validity of Congressional authority to regulate the environment,
doing so through the lens of commons analysis.241 This analysis
demonstrates that the federal government has traditionally
maintained constitutional authority to regulate two categories of
environmental resources as substantially affecting interstate
commerce: (1) natural resources contained on land (wetlands,
endangered species, or other natural capital) that are appropriated by
economic development (retail, housing, industrial, agricultural, etc.),
and (2) resources appropriated by individuals and tied to an
interstate market (wheat, marijuana, or other natural capital
commodities). Floodplains appropriated by economic development,
the spread of invasive species exacerbated by industrial operations
(and thus appropriating native flora and fauna), and clean Mississippi
River and Gulf water appropriated by agricultural and industrial
pollution all arguably fall under these tests. Anytime these
mechanisms of economic development replace the wetlands of
floodplains, native flora and fauna, or clean interjurisdictional waters,
there is an appropriator of the resource (such as a developer or an
industrial operator) and a resource that is being appropriated (such
as floodplain wetlands, native flora and fauna, or clean water). These
are the constituent components of a commons, and it is this act of

240. Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting).
241. Hudson, supra note 197.
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“appropriation” that substantially affects interstate commerce and
that gives the federal government constitutional authority over
resource management.242
Disaster law scholars have questioned whether the Commerce
Clause might be harnessed to allow more direct involvement by the
federal government in land-use-related disaster mitigation and
prevention, asking, for example, “[w]hat if Congress decided, in
advance of a disaster, to mitigate disaster risk by regulating local land
use? Would it have Commerce Clause authority, for instance, to
create federal zoning laws prohibiting building within 100 feet of an
earthquake fault?”243 Other disaster scholars have directly advocated
for greater top-down inputs from the federal government, asserting,
We need a more centralized regulatory system. Local initiative is
simply not reliable in the case of mitigation. Localities are reluctant
to enforce state standards, national standards are few, and
enforcement is lax. This is an area where centralized regulation—
standards and enforcement—is needed; given the political influence
of growth-oriented city officials and property and building
interests, there is bound to be a “failure” of the private market.244

In the specific context of flooding and sea-level rise, the
Association of State Floodplain Managers have similarly argued for
more top-down inputs, incorporating elements of dynamic
federalism, asserting that,
A nationwide vision and policy for water resources sustainability
and flood loss reduction are essential. This would require
legislation incorporating both a national floodplain management
policy and a national riparian and coastal areas policy. The act
should establish unequivocally both the value to the nation of these
resource areas and their natural functions, as well as their inherent
hazards. This policy needs to be supported with a comprehensive
legislative package to be coordinated with and implemented
through states, local governments, tribes, governors, and
others. . . . A high-level, central point of coordination and
implementation is needed to ensure that water-related laws and
programs at all levels are seamlessly aligned and integrated. This
could be a new federal agency or other entity . . . . We must
consider carefully the central question of whether a national policy
242. See id. at 423–27.
243. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 79.
244. PERROW, supra note 140, at 37.
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of water resources “development” is still relevant for 2050 and
beyond or whether a policy of water resources “sustainability” that
balances human and ecosystem needs is a wiser approach.245

Ultimately, if the federal government seeks regulatory inputs into
what the spectrum categorizes as perpetual or “gray area” disasters,
there are strong arguments that it may do so pursuant to its
Commerce Clause authority. Not only do perpetual and “gray area”
disasters more clearly impact interstate commerce, but they also
result in greater federal expenditures in disaster relief due to their
scale—thus implicating greater national interest. Furthermore, due
to the great scale of these disasters, the federal government has more
governance capacity to both set federal minimum standards and
enforce regulatory authority than do the many disparate state and
local governments along the Mississippi watershed or across
jurisdictions plagued by invasive species. The corollary, however, is
that a top-down mechanism for addressing transitory disasters is far
less likely to be constitutionally viable. Land-use policies that
exacerbate localized flooding, fires, and urban heat waves are more
likely to have impacts limited to a local area, where state and local
governments would have more governance capacity and information
to craft and enforce standards. In addition, the case for their
substantial effects on interstate commerce would arguably be harder
to make.
To be clear, a top-down mechanism is not without complication.
While perpetual disasters may be more readily considered to have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce than, say, endangered
species protection, they also fall more squarely within the category of
a direct land-use activity traditionally regulated by state and local
governments, such as zoning of commercial and residential
structures. This is because regulation of endangered species may only
indirectly impact land-use activities otherwise subject to state
regulatory authority.246 This makes passage of such legislation more
difficult as a political matter, especially given the current political
climate.247 The federal government may perceive that it is just as
245. ASS’N OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, supra note 41, at 35.
246. See Blake Hudson, Climate Change, Forests, and Federalism: Seeing the Treaty for the
Trees, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 363, 388–94 (2011).
247. The 2009 midterm congressional elections resulted in the largest shift in power in
the House of Representatives since 1948 and ushered in representatives opposed to not only
climate cap and trade, but also a wide swath of environmental regulatory policies. Quinn
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limited in enacting limits on floodplain development, nonpoint
source water pollution, or invasive species as it would be setting
growth boundaries around major U.S. cities, a zoning-driven
mechanism of land-use regulation currently the responsibility of the
states. Therefore, legal perception becomes political reality, as the
government politically acts as if its hands are tied due to perceived
legal constraints. In addition, an act granting top-down land-use
planning authority, even if passed, would be subject to other legal
protections afforded to private property owners, such as the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause. Even so, it certainly seems that
regulation requiring minimum standards for land-use planning in
these types of disaster prone areas could be crafted to avoid such
constitutional complications and could further be structured to
maintain the benefits provided by decentralized land-use policy.
Ultimately, though the constitutionality of federal subnational landuse legislation has yet to be tested by the U.S. Congress and within
U.S. courts, there are good arguments supporting its legitimacy and
expanded constitutional interpretation may be a viable top-down
mechanism for addressing perpetual and “gray area” disasters.248
A top-down approach, however, for reconstituting federalism to
mitigate and prevent land-use-related disasters is not a necessary or
inevitably preferable mechanism. While top-down inputs can
certainly be crafted in a way that preserves decentralized land-use
governance and the role of subnational governments in crafting
either their own policies or policies supplemental to federal policy,
top-down approaches are not without hazard. Improperly crafted
top-down prescriptive regulation “often leads to an increasing spiral
of tightening regulations, which progressively jeopardise the
viability” of decentralized governance.249 As such, bilateral and
horizontal approaches should also be considered.
Bowman & Chris Amico, Congress Loses Hundreds of Years of Experience—But Majority of
Incumbents Stick Around, PBS NEWSHOUR (Nov. 5, 2010, 11:00 AM),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2010/11/congress-loses-hundreds-of-years-ofexperience---but-vast-majority-of-incumbents-stick-around.html; Renee Schoof, With GOP in
Charge of House, Environmental Policy Will Shift, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (Nov. 3, 2010),
http://tinyurl.com/7fn2t3y; The Most Anti-Environment House in History, COMM. ON
ENERGY & COMMERCE DEMOCRATS, http://tinyurl.com/5ta3g93 (last visited Oct. 14,
2011).
248. See generally Hudson, supra note 197.
249. Graham R. Wilkinson, Forest Practices Bd., Codes of Forest Practice as Regulatory
Tools for Sustainable Forest Management 3, paper presented to the 18th Biennial Conference
of the Institute of Foresters of Australia (Oct. 3–8, 1999) (citation omitted) (“In contrast, a
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C. Bilateral

A bilateral approach to reconstituting federalism involves the
federal government incentivizing subnational governments to take
action on land-use planning aimed at mitigating or preventing
disasters, which can be accomplished in two basic ways. The first is a
cooperative federalism approach whereby the federal government
passes an act establishing minimum disaster-related land-use
planning standards to which subnational governments can
voluntarily bind themselves, while at the same time receiving
“carrots” in the form of financial payments or authority to dictate
policy over matters that might otherwise be the purview of the
federal government. The second approach is one of “uncooperative
federalism,” whereby the federal government might use other
constitutional “sticks” at its disposal, such as wielding the spending
power and refusing to fund projects within subnational jurisdictions
or refusing to provide some other entitlement subnational
governments normally receive. Under either approach, the federal
government “encourages” the states to develop minimum land-use
planning standards. Indeed, scholars have noted that in other landuse contexts, such as urban sprawl, “the complex institutional terrain
affecting [land use] requires substantial reliance on outright
acquisition of important green spaces as well as reliance on
regulatory strategies that entice participants, rather than prescribe a
particular urban form or seek to punish or coerce regulatory
targets.”250 Unlike the top-down approaches discussed in the
previous section, which are likely more constitutionally viable for
perpetual or “gray area” disasters than for transitory ones, a bilateral
mechanism may be utilized effectively and without constitutional
constraint for all disaster categories along the spectrum.

self-regulatory approach can avoid unnecessary bureaucratic costs and provide greater flexibility
and autonomy for industry, in return for improved environmental performance.”).
250. Buzbee, supra note 96, at 61. Indeed, one suggested approach for floodplain
management is federal purchase of properties at risk for flooding. The severe Midwest floods of
1993 resulted in the federal government buying 25,000 flooded residential properties at a cost
of $1 billion in a “voluntary buyout program designed to return floodplains to their natural
state.” FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 34.
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1. Cooperative federalism
Under a cooperative federalism approach, the federal
government could pass a “Land Use Disaster Mitigation and
Prevention Act” (LUDMPA) that sets minimum land-use planning
standards for disaster mitigation and prevention. The states would
develop their own land-use plans consistent with federal standards,
perhaps through the modification of their enabling acts, and would
voluntarily opt into the program based upon a variety of financial,
political, and legal incentives. Pursuant to dynamic federalism
principles, the state governments in turn could allow for local
government flexibility in setting those standards based upon local
needs and constraints, and would be allowed to set standards more
rigorous than or supplemental to federal standards. Subnational
governments would receive funds to implement the program, and
might also gain a degree of authority over not only federal actions,
but also the actions of adjacent subnational governments, to ensure
that those actions are consistent with the state plan. As discussed
further below, subnational governments refusing to opt into the act
might be induced to do so based upon a variety of disincentives,
such as the withdrawal of federal funds for projects within the
jurisdiction if they do not opt in within a certain time frame.
The LUDMPA could operate like a combination of the proposed
National Land Use Policy Act (NLUPA), which the U.S. Senate
passed twice in the early 1970s, but which was never enacted,251 and
the more narrow but ultimately (and relatively) successful CZMA.252
The purpose of the NLUPA was
to establish a national policy to encourage and assist the several
States to more effectively exercise their constitutional
responsibilities for the planning, management, and administration
of the Nation’s land resources through the development and
implementation of comprehensive “Statewide Environmental,
Recreational and Industrial Land Use Plans” . . . and management
programs designed to achieve an ecologically and environmentally
sound use of the Nation’s land resources.253

251. See, e.g., John R. Nolon, The National Land Use Policy Act, 13 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 519, 520–21 (1996).
252. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2006).
253. S. 3354, 91st Cong., 116 CONG. REC. S1760, S1761 (Jan. 29, 1970).
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NLUPA would have provided funding to states to develop their own
land-use management plans in accordance with federal standards as
well as a robust provision of data to assist the states in developing
such plans.254 Furthermore, the NLUPA would have established a
federal agency whose role would have been to coordinate and ensure
other federal agency compliance with state plans.255 State plans, in
turn, were to designate areas of conservation and areas of
development,256 and states with approved plans would have been
required to set management standards for five categories of land use
of “more than local concern”257:
(1) all development in areas of “critical environmental concern”;
e.g., beaches, wetlands, important wildlife habitats, and historic
sites;
(2) key facilities, such as major airports, highway interchanges, and
recreational facilities;
(3) large scale developments, such as industrial parks, shopping
centers, and major subdivisions;
(4) regional public or private facilities, such as solid waste disposal
or sewerage systems that significantly affect surrounding land uses;
and
(5) major recreational or second-home development of rural
land.258

The NLUPA would have “established a clear role for each level
of government and insured that their activities would be
coordinated.”259 Perhaps more importantly, “[i]t would have
integrated local, state and federal systems.”260 Some have argued that
“had such a law been adopted before the complex structure of
environmental law was cobbled together, the cost, complexity and
confusion of the current system could have been lessened.”261 The
254. 1 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 3:2 (5th ed. 2011).
255. Id.
256. John R. Nolon, Fusing Economic and Environmental Policy: The Need for Framework
Laws in the United States and Argentina, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 685, 719 (1996).
257. John H. Davidson, Ecosystem Management in the Smaller Watershed, 2 GREAT
PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 68, 76 (1997).
258. Id.
259. Nolon, supra note 256, at 724.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 718.
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voluntary approach, which promoted incentives to cooperate over
adherence to rigid standards,262 was intended to “lessen the ‘needless
and costly conflicts between agencies and departments of the Federal
Governments, between State and Federal Government, and between
State and local government.’”263 In other words, this approach has
the potential to alleviate the problems created by an overly zealous
top-down approach. Of course, the flip-side is that it might also have
less “bite” in achieving results on the ground because there is no
legally coercive foundation for ensuring the standards are put into
place.
Though the NLUPA was not passed, the United States has
already experimented with a bilateral approach in the land-use
context with CZMA, which was passed to gain greater state
involvement in the protection of the coastal zone and was based
upon a variety of federal standards.264 Many had hoped the CZMA
would be part of a larger land-use management act, such as the
NLUPA,265 but the CZMA was “successful” where the NLUPA
failed in part “due to the fact that it both aided development while
preserving the environment.”266
The CZMA program is completely voluntary, but the federal
government provides incentives to induce states to opt in.267 The first
incentive is simply funding the program’s implementation, which is
to be used to
preserve or restore specific areas in the state because of their
conservation, recreational, ecological, or aesthetic values, or contain
one or more resources of national significance; to redevelop . . .
deteriorating or underutilized urban waterfronts or ports; to
provide public access to public beaches, coastal waters and areas of
recreational, historical, aesthetic, ecological or cultural significance;

262. Id. at 724.
263. Id. at 724–25 (citing Senator Henry Jackson introducing Senate Bill 3354, National
Land Use Policy Act of 1970, 116 CONG. REC. S1757, S1759 (Jan. 29, 1970)).
264. SALKIN, supra note 254, § 3:3.
265. Marc R. Poirier, Environmental Justice and the Beach Access Movements of the 1970s
in Connecticut and New Jersey: Stories of Property and Civil Rights, 28 CONN. L. REV. 719, 751
(1996).
266. SALKIN, supra note 264, §3.3.
267. Id.
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or to develop a coordinated process for regulating permits for
aquaculture facilities.268

The second incentive is perhaps more enticing from a state
government point of view. The state effectively gains authority over
the actions of both the federal government and other state
governments that it would not otherwise have.269 After the federal
government has approved a state plan, the federal government
cannot undertake any action or even issue any permits for others to
take action within the state’s coastal zone unless those actions are
found by the state to be “consistent” with the state’s plan.270 So, for
example, the U.S. Coast Guard may want to build a new facility
within a state’s coastal zone. Though the agency previously had the
authority to do so at its discretion, it now must obtain confirmation
from the state in which the facility is to be located that siting of the
facility will be consistent with the state’s CZMA implementation
plan. The same holds true for the actions of adjacent states in the
coastal zone—there is a reciprocal responsibility for adjacent states to
act, or authorize other parties to act, consistent with their neighbors’
plans.271 At present, thirty-four U.S. states and territories maintain
agencies approved by the federal government to implement the
CZMA.272
Though the NLUPA was never enacted, and the CZMA has
been criticized as inconsistent273 and may not have the “bite” that it
perhaps could have, these examples of bilateral approaches to
reconstituting the balance of federal and subnational roles in landuse policy provide models for how a similar act might be structured
for disaster-related land-use planning. Furthermore, the great degree
of flexibility that a bilateral mechanism facilitates would be equally
viable, if structured properly, for addressing perpetual, transitory, or
“gray area” disasters, either supplemental to, or in lieu of, top-down
or horizontal approaches. Therefore, a bilateral approach could be
coupled with, or supplemental to, top-down or horizontal

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
(1997).

Id. (footnotes omitted).
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 81
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approaches related to the same or other categories of disaster
consistent with principles of dynamic federalism.
2. Uncooperative federalism
Uncooperative federalism is the “mostly stick” end of the
bilateral spectrum, with the federal government not providing
“carrots” in the form of positive incentives for cooperation, but
rather disincentives through the threat of withholding federal funds
from states.274 The federal government may withhold federal
highway funds, for instance, as it has successfully done in other
contexts.275 Or the federal government could withhold funds that it
normally funnels to the states to implement other federal statutes for
which the federal government maintains constitutional authority,
such as the Clean Water Act in the United States. Professor Buzbee
has noted that
[o]ne of the most promising and traditional methods for the
federal government to encourage state or local actions consistent
with a federal goal is to provide conditional federal funding for
certain state or local activities. Given the substantial undercutting
by the Supreme Court of other federal strategies to enlist states in
furthering federally defined ends, conditional federal spending has
become a particularly significant regulatory strategy.276

274. This usage of the phrase “uncooperative federalism” is only meant as a descriptor
and is not to be confused with any particular theory of federalism. See, e.g., Jessica BulmanPozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1263 (2009)
(providing a theory of uncooperative federalism that takes “a fully developed account of the
ways in which states playing the role of federal servant can also resist federal mandates”).
275. E.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
276. Buzbee, supra note 96, at 107. Professor Nolon has argued that the Disaster
Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA) provides a model of federal, state, and local interaction that
“could be a blueprint for an integrated federalist approach to a host of land use and
environmental problems.” Nolon, supra note 194, at 965. The DMA relies in part on
uncooperative federalism approaches, requiring that subnational governments develop
mitigation plans that identify hazard risks in their jurisdictions in order to qualify for federal
hazard mitigation grants. Id. Even so, “there is little emphasis in [the regulations] on the use
of effective local land-use strategies to create disaster resilient, or adaptive, communities.” Id.
at 967. This does not mean, however, that some states and local communities are not
influenced by the DMA to engage in more robust land-use planning in disaster prone areas.
E.g., CITY OF BOULDER, COLO., BOULDER VALLEY COMPREHENSIVE PLAN (2008), available
at http://www.bouldercolorado.gov/files/PDS/BVCP/bvcp.pdf; Growth Management Act,
WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A (2008).
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Further highlighting the potential benefits of a bilateral
approach, Professor Buzbee states that “monetary enticements to
encourage participation in [land-use] initiatives are likely the most
effective device to surmount complex institutional frameworks where
no unitary entity with coercive authority exists and where different
local needs may lead to different levels of interest in such
programmatic goals.”277
At a minimum, the federal government could withhold
expenditures for programs that exacerbate land-use-related disasters.
Indeed, experts argue that a clear way to mitigate and prevent
flooding in local communities is to restrict federal expenditures that
could “foster development or infrastructure in high-risk and/or
environmentally sensitive areas.”278 These experts argue that federal
programs that fund and subsidize development or redevelopment in
flood-prone areas—including disaster relief—“unwittingly provide
for making unwise decisions and taking inappropriate action with
regard to our water resources.”279 This is the approach of the Coastal
Barrier Resources Reauthorization Act of 2000 (CBRA),280 another
example of a current bilateral mechanism aimed at flooding and
damage in coastal areas. The CBRA designates undeveloped coastal
barrier islands for inclusion in the Coastal Barrier Resource
System.281 Once designated, the Act denies federal funds for new
construction on those islands,282 and “specifically denies direct
federal grants for infrastructure improvements, coastal protection
projects, and [flood] insurance for any new construction.”283 The
program has had limited success, however, and “[t]he continued
development of coastal barrier islands highlights the conclusion that
merely denying federal subsidies to coastal floodplains would not
prevent their development. Rather . . . property owners may find it

277. Buzbee, supra note 96, at 117.
278. ASS’N OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, supra note 41, at 33.
279. Id. at 34. Furthermore, a variety of federal agency programs, such as the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Agriculture, the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Economic Development
Administration have subsidized and promoted development in floodplains. FARBER ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 32–33.
280. Coastal Barrier Resources Reauthorization Act of 2000, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3510
(2006).
281. Id. §§ 3502–3503.
282. Id. § 3504.
283. Barnhizer, supra note 18, at 339–40.

2055

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/20/2011 2:51 PM

2011

profitable to incur occasional flood damages in exchange for the high
rental returns possible from desirable beachfront properties.”284
In reality, to be effective, an uncooperative federalism
arrangement would most likely need to be tied to a cooperative
bilateral statute. Interestingly, though the NLUPA would have been
a voluntary program, it was not without teeth in the sense that it
blended cooperative and uncooperative federalism approaches. For
example, under the NLUPA, if a state failed to adopt a land-use plan
within four years after the act was passed then the state would stop
receiving funding for other federal programs, such as highway
construction or other public works, which would be reduced by 20
percent a year until the state developed a land-use plan in comport
with NLUPA standards.285 Later amendments to the bill actually
strengthened sanctions, providing that if a state did not submit a
statewide plan within five years, then “no federal agency was
permitted to undertake any new action or financially support any
state action that may have a substantially adverse environmental
impact.”286 Such a provision would, for example, grind commercial
development in wetland areas to a halt if states did not pass a state
plan, as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers must permit the filling of
wetlands connected to “navigable waters” for development.
Ultimately, an uncooperative federalism approach might be a
viable tool for reconstituting federalism related to land-use-related
disaster mitigation and prevention, especially when coupled with a
cooperative federalism statute. Given that the U.S. Congress
seriously considered such an approach in the land-use context with
NLUPA and has succeeded in a “soft” approach with the CZMA in
the environmental and land-use context without state resistance—
and indeed with broad state participation—a bilateral statute aimed
at subnational land-use-related disaster policy, if properly crafted,
might be a successful mechanism for rebalancing federal-state roles in
disaster mitigation and prevention. This is especially so if a topdown, expanded constitutional interpretation approach does not
prove viable for transitory or other categories of disaster. For

284. Id. at 340.
285. Jayne E. Daly, A Glimpse of the Past—A Vision for the Future: Senator Henry M.
Jackson and National Land-Use Legislation, 28 URB. LAW. 7, 12 (1996) (citing National Land
Use Policy Act of 1970, S. 3354, 91st Cong. § 407(1), 116 CONG. REC. S1757, S1762 (Jan.
20, 1970)).
286. Id. at 18.
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transitory disasters, in fact, a bilateral mechanism might be the most
viable as it would perhaps be the best way to capitalize on local
information and decision-making; its voluntary nature would also
avoid federalism concerns because transitory disasters implicate landuse planning more closely tied to traditional state and local
functions.
D. Horizontal
A horizontal approach to reconstituting federalism would result
if subnational governments agreed with other subnational
governments to take collective action to address land-use planning in
the disaster law context—even in the absence of a top-down mandate
or voluntary bilateral program. For example, states can create
regional land-use disaster management plans, whereby each agrees to
legislate minimum standards related to the siting of development in
disaster-prone areas, the structural requirements that mitigate
disaster destruction, and other standards.
A top-down approach is a compulsory mechanism for the federal
government to reconstitute federalism, while a bilateral approach
operates by federal provision of incentives to do the same.
Horizontal approaches, on the other hand, rely almost entirely on
the volition of subnational governments (unless the horizontal
approaches are themselves induced by federal incentives). This is the
same volition, notably, that currently facilitates a great degree of
subnational government inaction on crafting disaster-related, landuse planning standards. In this way, horizontal approaches may be
unlikely, absent some other change in the status quo spurred by
higher levels of governance. Ultimately, it is unclear why subnational
governments that currently fail to maintain individual jurisdictional
standards related to disaster land-use planning would band together
to craft standards with a group of other states or local governments.
Indeed, forging horizontal approaches can be intractable in the
absence of incentives or mandates from a higher regulatory
authority, or from sustained, increased attention and pressure from
civil society.287 As Professor Buzbee describes in the context of landuse policies exacerbating urban sprawl,

287.

Buzbee, supra note 96, at 94.
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[Local government] officials will in most instances not surrender
authority [for horizontal approaches] . . . . Greater governmental
consolidation and coordination might reduce sprawl and its
associated ills, but it is difficult to see how such consolidation and
coordination would come about in the absence of a period of
heightened citizen political involvement sufficient to persuade the
state government to modify the authority granted to local
governments.288

Even so, this approach should be briefly discussed, as it is not
without precedent. In the disaster context, though not related
specifically to land-use-related disaster mitigation and prevention
policies, a horizontal example exists in the form of the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).289 EMAC is an interstate
compact providing for mutual cooperation among states to
supplement federal response and aid subsequent to disaster events.290
The EMAC establishes that “[e]ach party state entering into this
compact recognizes that many emergencies transcend political
jurisdictional boundaries and that intergovernmental coordination is
essential in managing these and other emergencies under this
compact.”291 All fifty states have entered the compact, and the
National Emergency Management Association has prepared “Model
Intrastate Mutual Aid Legislation” to “facilitate mutual aid
agreements between political subdivisions of a state.”292 EMAC
proved to be one of the few relative successes in facilitating response
after Hurricane Katrina.293
There are additional reasons that state or local governments
might band together to create, for example, “Regional Land Use
Disaster Management Standards.” The first is simply federal inaction.
In the climate change context, federal inaction has spurred the
creation of a number of carbon cap-and-trade initiatives aimed at
curbing carbon emissions. These cap-and-trade initiatives include the
following: the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, including the
states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,

288. Id. at 95–96.
289. Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Pub. L. No. 104-321, 110 Stat.
3877 (1996).
290. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 171.
291. Id. at 172.
292. Id. at 176.
293. Id. at 177–78.
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New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and
Vermont; the Midwestern Regional GHG Reduction Accord,
including the states of Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota,
and Wisconsin, and the Canadian province of Manitoba; and the
Western Climate Initiative, including the states of Arizona,
California, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Washington,
and the Canadian provinces of British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario,
and Quebec.294 Indeed, states may be motivated to tie carbon
sequestration offsets to their carbon-trading schemes in a way that
fundamentally alters land-use standards related to wetland and forest
restoration and preservation—which would also mitigate and prevent
damage related to flooding, sea-level rise, hurricanes, forest fires, and
even heat waves as carbon-based natural capital is integrated into
land-use plans and reduces ambient local temperatures. Indeed,
coastal wetlands are the resource that sequesters carbon to the
greatest degree—greater than nearly any other upland terrestrial
ecosystem.295
Additionally, if states are truly concerned with federal inaction on
climate change, as evidenced by the formation of regional cap-andtrade schemes, then presumably they would be interested in reducing
the destruction from urbanization of natural capital that protects
against disaster events, such as floodplain wetlands. After all, it seems
that preserving natural capital like coastal wetlands to sequester
carbon may potentially be less politically contentious than reducing
industrial emissions—though certainly there are private property
rights to consider. Even so, if state and local governments get serious
about the threats to wetlands and other natural capital from
urbanization,296 then there are strong incentives to create regional
land-use compacts in order to head off concerns of a race-to-thebottom, whereby urban development interests might flee to other
jurisdictions due to floodplain wetland or other resource preservation
statutes in the jurisdiction in which they wish to develop.297 By
crafting regional agreements, individual state and local governments

294. See North American Cap-and-Trade Initiatives, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/NA-capandtrade
(last visited Oct. 14, 2011).
295. Joy B. Zedler & Suzanne Kercher, Wetland Resources: Status, Trends, Ecosystem
Services, and Restorability, 30 ANN. REV. ENVTL. RESOURCES 39, 55 (2005).
296. See generally WEAR & GREIS, supra note 133.
297. See Hudson, supra note 17; see also supra Part III.B.
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can preserve economic growth while tackling both climate change
and disaster mitigation and prevention via forest or wetland carbon
sequestration in areas that would otherwise be under development
pressure.
Ultimately, there is little precedent in the United States for
subnational horizontal approaches to land-use planning. The drivers
for such arrangements, however, may be in place, with states already
taking action on carbon cap-and-trade and facing threats to natural
capital from urbanization. As with bilateral mechanisms, horizontal
mechanisms would be suitable to address transitory disasters in
particular; the “fit” of regional land-use policies related to transitory
disasters that have more localized impacts is perhaps more conducive
to horizontal approaches. Given the broader scale of “gray area” and
perpetual disasters, however, it would seem horizontal approaches
would only be useful in the event there were no other mechanisms in
place to holistically address those categories of disaster. Even then, a
patchwork of regional horizontal schemes would likely not provide
the most effective means of addressing perpetual and “gray area”
disasters. Though of course, in line with principles of dynamic
federalism, a mix of approaches across scales should be utilized to
address all categories of disaster.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the climate continues to change and populations continue to
increase, so too will disasters continue to grow in both frequency
and severity. One of the clearest means of mitigating or preventing
future disaster events is to reconceptualize the society- and
economic-driven structure of a land-use planning system that too
often places people directly in the path of disaster events. The
propensity of people to live in hazardous areas “may appear to be the
result of private, individual decisions,”298 but are actually “shaped by
local land use policies, and those local land use decisions are, in turn,
heavily influenced by state and federal incentives. Effective mitigation
of all types of natural hazards . . . thus depends heavily on
governmental actions and decisions.”299
Though state and federal incentives certainly play a role in either
facilitating or avoiding land-use-related disasters, federal
298. FARBER ET AL., supra note 1, at 25.
299. Id. at 26.
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constitutional structure that effectively prohibits certain types of
regulatory prohibitions from being formulated at the federal level
also complicates responsible land-use planning in the disaster
context. For certain disasters, like those that are perpetual in nature
or in the “gray area,” greater federal input is clearly warranted. They
also may be more constitutionally justified, even given remnant
dualist conceptions of land-use federalism. In addition, consistent
with principles of dynamic federalism, bilateral and horizontal
approaches for reconstituting land-use federalism are valuable for
addressing both perpetual and “gray area” disasters as well as
transitory disasters.
Ultimately, a more clear and holistic focus on the institutional
hurdles that complicate land-use-related disaster mitigation and
prevention allows a corresponding focus on the types of legislative
responses needed to address them. A failure to craft effective
legislative responses in the face of these institutional hurdles and a
failure to reconstitute the current and inadequate balance of multilevel governance aimed at land-use planning will only beget a
continuation of a vicious cycle after disaster strikes—state and local
governments crying out for the federal cavalry to come and save
them from land-use planning mistakes for which they are primarily
responsible.
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